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INTRODUCTION 
Muslim Personal Law 
The Tensions 
Joseph Schacht has adequately summarized the Muslim attitude 
towards the law in his statement: 
"Islamic Law is the epitome of the Islamic spirit, the 
most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, 
the kernel of Islam itself. For the majority of 
Muslims, the law has always been and still is 'of much 
practical importance than dogma. Even today the law 
remains a decisive element in the struggle which is 
being fought in Islam between traditionalism a~d 
modernism under the impact of Western ideas." 
The truism contained in the latter part of this statement is 
conceded, namely, the conflict between traditional and 
modern approaches to the law. This tension also affects 
Muslim Personal Law (MPL), even though it is a diluted part 
of the main corpus of Islamic law or Shari'a. Underlying the 
overall discussion of my thesis will be this constant tug-
of-war between modern and traditional perceptions of the 
world, politics and the law of Islam. MPL deals primarily 
with one small part of the law, namely, the laws of 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. However, this thesis is 
not a treatise on MPL per se. It examines the relationship 
between religion, law and politics in contemporary South 
Africa. In other words, this thesis is about the 'politics' 
of MPL. 
1. Joseph Schacht, "Pre-Islamic Background and Early 
Development of Jurisprudence" in Khadduri & Liebesny (eds) 
Law in the Middle East: Origin & Development of Islamic Law, 
New York, Polity, 1984, p. 28. 
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Method 
What I have coined as 'politics' occur at two levels, namely 
at th~ level of the differing political perceptions of 
Muslims and at the level of how they interact with the 
modern-state. This study approaches the subject from two 
angles. The first deals with a community's self-perception 
in relation to its religious symbols and values. The second 
involves an understanding of the human reality we 
experience. Law, ideology, economics and a host of other 
forces dictate the destinies of people. It is against the 
backdrop of the above two levels that the implications of 
the implementation of MPL is examined in this thesis. 
It must be said at the outset that MPL has as yet not been 
applied in South Africa. The debate regarding its 
'implementation has only begun. This thesis thus looks into 
the dynamics of this experience. Some aspects of the debate 
is also based on projections and comparative studies. 
The Problem 
I will introduce the problem of MPL by way of an example in 
recent Indian history. This example provides a suitable 
entry point to understanding religious law within an 
increasingly modernizing context. It illustrates the 
problems that arise when the religious and political fields 
intersect. 
0 
The verdict of Justice Y V Chandrachud of the Indian Supreme 
Court of India in the famous case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan, 
Appellant v. Shah Bano Begum and others,(respondents in 
1985), incensed Muslims in India. The gist of the case 
centres around the notion of conflicting notions of what the 
Shari'a is. rs it evolutionary or is it static as some 
sections of orthodoxy believe? In addition, it relates to 
the p~oblems of a religious law being adapted to a modern 
society and the political processes that accompany it. 
3 
The case involved a 75 year-old divorced woman, Shah Bano 
Begum of Indore, in the state.of Madhya Pradesh. After being 
driven out of her matrimonial home in 1975 by her husband, 
Shah Bano filed a petition against him in terms of section 
125 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure asking for a 
maintenance rate of Rs500 per month. The appellant, (the 
husband) refused to pay maintenance, arguing that she ceased 
to be his wife after he had irrevocably repudiated her in 
terms of the Muslim rule of talag. And, that he had already 
paid her a sum of Rs200 per month. for two years and had 
deposited a sum of Rs3 000 in the court by way of dower 
during the period of 'idda - a period of three menstrual 
cycles after the date of talag. Her husband, the appellant, 
an_advocate by profession, earned a salary of Rs60, 000 per 
year. In the 1979 the Indore magistrate's court directed the 
appellant to.pay a princely sum of Rs25 per month, which the 
High Court of Madhya Pradesh increased to Rs179.20 per month 
in July 1980. 
Justice Chandrachud in his verdict cited in obiter that the 
conflict between sections 125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure-and section 127 (C) of the same Code was resolved 
4 
by an interpretation. This interpretation of the law was to 
become the focus of religious and political crises. 
Chandrachud's statement as reported in the judgement 
deserves full quotation. Muslim Personal Law, he said, did 
not ... 
" ... countenance cases in which the wife is unable to 
maintain herself after the divorce. We consider it not 
only incorrect but unjust, to extend the scope of the 
statements to cases in which a divorced wife is unable 
to maintain herself. We are of the opinion that the 
application of those statements of law must be 
restricted to that class of cases, in which there is no 
possibility of vagrancy and destitution ... it would be 
wrong to hold that the Muslim husband, according to his 
personal law, is not under an- obligation to provide 
maintenance, beyond the period of 'iddat, to his 
divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. The 
argument of the appellant that, according to the Muslim 
Personal Law, his liability to provide for the 
maintenance of his divorced wife is limited to the 
period of 'iddat, despite the fact that she is unab1e 
to maintain herself, has therefore to be rejected." 
The judge supported by four other judges cited verses from 
the Qur'an in support of his interpretation. However, the 
outcry over the decision had severe political repercussions. 
The ruling party Congress Party in the Indian parliament was 
forced to introduce a Bill entitled, "The Muslim Women 
(Protection o~ Rights of Divorce) Bill, 1986" in Parliament 
in order to take divorced Muslim women out of the purview of 
section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Chandrachud's 
judgement was premised on an interpretation of section 1253 
which took into consideration the general welfare of Indian 
citizens as additional protection in terms of civil law. 
The pioblems here reflect the conflict between modernity and 
traditional systems of law. It also involves a political 
2. Janak Raj Jai, Shah Bano, Rajiv Publications, New Delhi, 
1986, pp. 32-33 from reproduced record of the Justice 
Chandrachud's judgement. 
3. Ibid, p. 82. 
debate between opposing religious groups which in turn have 
different political loyalties within a nation-state model. 
It also raises some questions regarding the future of MPL. 
With these questions in mind we proceed to examine the 
socio-political implications of MPL in South Africa. 
5 
CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT IS THE SHARI'A? 
Introduction 
Societies carry the arduous responsibility of choosing laws 
that are consistent with their historical, traditional and 
intellectual values as well as their socio-economic mores. 
At the same time they also expect the law to provide them 
with optimal protection in two primary ways - through 
efficacy and convenience. By efficacy is meant that law be 
viewed as a value-system suitable to the social- context in 
which it functions. Convenience would imply that the demands 
of the law are not unduly harsh. Islamic Law or the Shari'a 
is no exception. 1 
The celebrated Spanish Muslim jurist, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi 
(died 790/1308), points out that the element of convenience 
is an important feature of the Shari'a. 
God made this righteous Shari'a accommodating and 
convenient and thus won the hearts of men and 
invoked in them love and respect for the law. Had 
they had to act against convenience they c2u1d not 
have honestly fulfilled their obligations. 
1. I will temporarily equate the term Islamic law with the 
Shari'a, although later in the chapter I will show that they 
are different. 
2. Cited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: 
A study of Abu Ishag al-Shatibi's Life and Thought, Islamic 
Research Institute, Islamabad, 1977 p iii. Unfortunately 
M;:isud does not give any reference to the original source of 
the statement which I suspect is in al-Shatibi's major work 
on legal theory, al-Muwafagaat. 
6 
Al-Shatibi's celebrated status within the mainstream of the 
Maliki3 school of Islamic law precludes any hasty judgement 
to construe the above statemeht as being support~ve of 
modern-day libertine 'legal liberalism'. 
The element of convenience - yusr - is an expressed Qur'anic 
norm referring to God's will - iradah. The relevant verse of 
the Qur'an reads ..• 
God desires/wills (iradah) easa (yusr) for you, and 
desires not hardship for you. 
In a well-known saying - Hadith- of the Prophet he is 
reported to have said ... 
Make things convenient and do not make things 
burdensome. 
In this sense God's will itself ensures convenience for 
those who obey His law. The Divine will is the metaphysical 
or doctrinal feature and convenience is its manifestation in 
the socio-historical realm. The creative tension between 
iradah and yusr provides a dynamic feature to Islamic social 
practice of which Islamic law is an important aspect. In 
this sequence of ideas it is clear that convenience - yusr -
is one component of the Divine will. Logically it implies 
that if the Shari'a is not convenient and efficacious it is 
possible that it may become burdensome and ineffective. 
While the above sentiment reflected in al-Shatibi's 
exposition of Islamic law may be absent in the contemporary 
practice of Islamic law, it has nevertheless been an 
G~ Founded by Malik ibn Anas (d 179/795), a jurist of Madina nd one of the four prominent Islamic legal schools (madhab pl. madhahib). 
4. Al-Qur'an, 2:185 
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important component of Islamic legal philosophy in the past. 
In what follows I will argue that the flexible and 
contextual perspective of the Shari'a is historically valid. 
The continued relevance of this legal code rests on its 
flexibility and dynamism and its ability to adapt to socio-
historical changes. To state that the Shari'a is totally 
immutable is as problematic as saying that it's flexibility 
is unrestrained. 
The Etymological and Linguistic Structure of the Shari'a. 
Ibn Manzoor (630-711/1232-1311), the author of one of most 
authoritative Arabic lexicons explains that •.. 
shir'a and shari'a [both derivatives] in the 
spoken language of the Arabs means a watering-
place. It is the habitual drinking place of people 
who reside on a bank of a river and also that of 
animals. The Arabs do not call such a watering5 place a Shari'a unless the water is abundant. 
8 
The inherent symbolism in the word Shari'a equates it with a 
life-giving source. An explanation of the word refers to ..• 
that which God had patterned (sanna) in the 
religion (din) and commanded like fasting, prayer, 
pilgrimage~lms-tax and all acts of virtue 
(birr) ... In this same sense is God's statement [in 
the Qur'an] 'Then We made thee follow a Path, from 
the Command ('amr) (45:18), ... 'for each one of ygu 
have We appointed a shir'a and a minhaj'. (5:48) 
In the first instance Ibn Manzoor relates shir'a to din or 
primordial religion. In this sense, Shari'a and its 
'derivatives have a close relation to a primordial or 
metaphysical Path. The scope of this primordial Path is 
again.further expanded by linking it to a Command ( 'amr), 
5. Ibn Manzoor, Lisan ul-Arab, vol 4, Darul Ma'arif, Cairo p 
2238. 
6. Ibid. 
9 
giving it an additional dimension of being a 'Path from the 
Command' ('ala shari'atin min al-'amr) 7 . In this regard 
Rahman's explanation of the Command is most helpful .... 
This 'Command' must be what the Qur'an calls the 
'Preserved Tablet' or the 'Mother of all Books'. 
It is called the 'Command' because although it 
contains everything, 8the essence of it is its imperatives for man. 
The word minhaj also connotes a road or Way but is to 
differentiates between itself and Shari'a (Path) 9 • Minhaj 
means a "clear and distinguished Way" -wadihan or "straight 
path" - al-tariq al mustagim, whereas the Shari'a is only 
viewed as the "beginning of the Path" - 'ibtida' al-tarig. 
lO Against this background Shari'a connotes a sense of 
-
'sustenance' and the beginning of the Path, differing from 
minhaj which stresses the lucidity of the Way. The inter-
related semantical field of shari'a, din and 'amr implies an 
essence and primordialness which I believe is coterminus 
with the eternal and immutable connotation of the Shari'a-. 
However, the link between Shari'a and minhaj signifies 
another dimension. The latter is also a Way, but is more 
defined, t~ngible, and practical, as opposed to the 
essentialist connotation of the Shari'a. Viewed as a 
practical Way - minhaj - leads us to some understanding of 
7. Al-Qur'an 45:18. 
8. Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an, Bibleotheca 
Islamica, Chicago, 1980, p. 98. · 
9. Because of the subtle linguistic differences, but yet an 
important distinction, I have translated Shari'a as a Path, 
with a metaphysical implication, i.e. a metaphysical Path. 
Minhaj is translated as a Way, implying thereby a practical 
Way in which acts are done. 
10. Ibn Manzoor, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 2238; vol 6, p. 4554. 
how of the Shari'a actually discloses itself in practical 
terms. 
A juristic excursus of the notion of Shari'a 
Evidence that the Shari'a, or part of it, has always been 
flexible or contextual can be found in the way Mu~lim 
jurists have explained and practiced it. Most of the 
classical compendiums and glosses on Islamic law and legal 
10 
theory do not enter into any philosophical definition of the 
Shari'a per se, except by elucidating its linguistic 
dimensions. However, the legal discourse only becomes 
effective when the positive law is brought into relationship 
with the,sacerdotal or meta-legal requirements of the 
Shari'a11 • It is for these reasons, briefly stated here, 
; 
that it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
propose a universal and monolithic technical definition of 
the Shari'a. At a practical level, a proliferation of legal 
theories abound in Muslim jurisprudence, applying variant 
methods to deduce Shari'a ordinances and rules from what 
Muslim jurists call the four chief sources of the Shari'a 
the Qur'an, Hadith, consensus and analogy. 
The principal science that determines knowledge of the 
Shari'a is known as usul al-fiqh, literally translated to 
mean 'sources or roots of the science of knowing the law'. 
usul (sing. asl) means indicant(s) ( daleel pl. adilla). 
Usul al-fiqh is thus the Islamic legal theory. It 
specifically deals with methods of analysing the four 
11. Aziz al-Azmeh, (ed.) "Islamic Legal Theory and The 
Appropriation of Reality", in Islamic Law: Social and 
Historical Contexts, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 252. 
universal indicants or sources of the Shari'a . 12 Legal 
theory deals not only with legal philosophy proper but also 
entertains questions of linguistics, logic, methodology, 
13 
epistemology and theology. 
Differences in the understanding of Islamic law (fiqh) 
arises because scholars adopt different legal theories. 14 
As mentioned earlier, legal theory involves a vast array of 
disciplines which are unlikely to result in unanimous 
opinions. It was precisely because of differences in legal 
theory that four major legal schools, known as the Hanafi15 , 
Shafi', Maliki and Hanbali16 schools, named after their 
founders, have survived to this day. This diversity in legal 
interpretation, arising out of theoretical differences, have 
12. Wahba al- Zuhayli, Al-Wasit fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami, 
Darul Kutub, 1978, pp. 13-15; Nabil' Shehaby, "'Illa and 
Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal Theory", in Journalof the 
American Oriental Society, 102.1, 1982, p. 27; Wael B 
Hallaq, "Considerations on the Function and Character of 
Sunni Legal Theory", in Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 104.4, 1984, pp. 679-680. 
13. Shehaby, op. cit. 
14. This has been well argued in a PhD thesis submitted to 
the Al-Azhar University, Cairo by Dr Mustafa Sa'id al-Khinn, 
published as Athar ul-Ikhtilaaf fil Qawa'id al-Usuliyya fi 
Ikhtilaafil Fuqahaa, (The Effects of Differences in Legal 
Theories on the Disputations of the Jurists), Muassasa al-
Risalah, Beirut, (fourth edition) 1406/1985. 
15. Founded by Nu'man bin Thabit, better known by his 
agnomen, Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), based in Kufa, Iraq. This 
school is kno~n for its use of E.U, free opinion and 
interpretation in the light of local customary practices. 
His school later favoured the Abbassids whose capital was in 
Baghdad. (see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, pp. 81-82.) ' 
16. Initially a follower of Al-Shafi' who continued to push 
the latter's insistence on Hadith in law to the extremes. 
The school of ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) started as a populist 
movement in opposition to the Abbassid court in Baghdad but 
later developed its own independent character. ( see Fazlur 
Rahman, Islam, p. 82; R.S.Humphreys, Islamic History, p. 
195. ) 
11 
12 
also been caused by the social contexts in which the jurists 
framed their paradigms. 17 
Some of the cardinal differences in legal theory arise 
because of the variant and often conflicting theories 
applied. These range from different linguistic methods which 
have an effect on legal interpretation18 ; the ability of 
words to include and exclude meanings19 ; conflicting logical 
arguments in understanding commands and prohibitions20 ; 
variant exegetical principles affecting the interpretation 
of Qur'an and Hadith texts21 ; differences in interpreting 
consensus and analogy; 22 the application of a host of 
controversial sources such as the status of the statements 
of the Prophet's Companions; the legitimacy of presumption 
of continuity (istishaab), and the validity of the notion of 
the public weal (masalih al-mursala) 23 . Furthermore, 
different emphases are placed on certain aspects of legal~ 
theory. For instance while analogy is generally accepted by 
the four legal schools, each allocates it to a status 
different to the other. What is generally overlooked is that 
theory of whatever kind is also a product of a specific 
socio-economic formation. The social context 
character of the theory. 
I 
also shapes_:_J 
17. See Martha Mundy's essay, "The Family, Inheritance and 
Islam: A Re-Examination of the Sociology of Fara'id Law", in 
Islamic Law, (ed) al-Azmeh. 
18. Al Khinni, op.cit., p. 121. 
19. Ibid., p. 197. 
20. Ibid., p. 295. 
21. Ibid., p. 379. 
22. Ibid., p. 453. 
23. Ibid., p. 529. 
Any disc~ssion of Shari'a inevitably involves a discussion 
on fiqh. Linguistically, figh means, "understanding or 
cognition or discernment",- al-fahm. In juristic terms~ 
using al-Shafi"s (150-204/767-819) popular definition, it 
means "the science of knowing the practical Shari·a rules 
which have been derived from their detailed indicants or 
sources 11 •
24 Figh is then a set of derived rules from certain 
"detailed sources". Sources are considered to be detailed 
after they have been methodologically arranged and analysed 
by legal theory. Jurists also make it clear that the status 
of figh is. not that of certain knowledge -gati"- but that of 
a probable category - zanni. 25 Since figh involves an 
element of "probabilism' due to its derivative nature it can 
26 be substituted by another probable category while perfect 
knowledge only rests with God. 
Masud summarizes the contemporary debate in legal theory 
between those who tenaciously hold on to the view that 
Islamic law is immutable and those who propose that it is 
adaptable. The immutability-view claims that Islamic law 
does not change and in so doing cannot change. Rulings 
pronounced by the Shari ·a in the past are "static, final, 
eternal, absolute and unalterable 11 • 27 The adaptability-view, 
maintains that Islamic law changes, has changed and moreover 
can be changed further. 28 Adaptability means the law could 
be modified to meet new circumstances. In other words, it is 
theoretically possible to expand the existing body of law 
24. Al-Zuhayli, op. cit., p. 16. 
25. Al-Zuhayli, op.cit., p. 16. 
26. See Kerr's levels 2 & 3 developed below. 
27. Masud, op. cit., p 21. 
28. Ibid. 
13 
and to regard it as open to change according to social 
conditions. 29 
In their bid to prove that the Shari'a undergoes change, the 
adaptability view collapses the juristic distinction between 
fiqh and Shari'a and reduce both to the category of fiqh. 30 
In terms of legal theory they do not make a distinction 
between the two, except at an epistemological level. The 
immutability-view "believes Shari'a and fiqh are distinct 
but are inseparably connected. The Shari'a being the law, 
and fiqh being the science of knowing the law. 1131 Despite 
their claim to maintain a distinction between fiqh and 
Shari 'a the immutability-view effectively elevates fiqh to 
the level of Shari'a, and for all practical purposes there 
is no distinction. The consequences of these views are that 
the adaptability-view suppresses the immutable dimension of 
the Shari'a in order to stress the mutability, openness and 
flexibility of the Shari'a. The immutability-view, in turn, 
emphasizes the immutable dimension of the Shari'a but fails 
to explain the relationship between immutability and 
flexibility in practical terms. Needless to say, both 
viewpoints fall short of a satisfactory explanation. 
A fundamental distinction ought to be made between the 
14 
adaptability versus immutability views. The former maintains 
that change is connected to the nature of Islamic law, while 
the latter rejects t~at assertion. The immutability-view 
concedes that while changes have taken place in early Islam 
29. Ibid. 
30. Masud, op.cit., p. 22. 
31. Ibid. 
these were not recognized by the legal theorists. The 
differences in the two views, in Masud's opinion, is not 
about the historicity .of legal changes but about the 
32 implications of change for legal theory. 
In practical terms it is difficult to pigeon-hole any 
particular legal school or institution in.South Africa or 
elsewhere in the Muslim world under the rubric of these 
broad categories. A cursory glance at judicial statements -
fatawa- indicate that there are many shades between the 
extremes of adaptability and immutability. This in itself 
lends weight to the argument that theoretically and even 
practically no uniform pattern of Shari'a interpretation 
prevails. 
Malcolm Kerr, however, provides a formula that may assist us 
in eliminating the ambiguity between the immutability and 
adaptability views. In his discussion of juristic theory in 
Islam he describes four levels of meaning which have moral 
significance. 33 
These four levels of meaning are: 
1) In relation to the Divine Will, a metaphysical reality 
upon which all existence is contingent as well as the 
~riginal categorical imperative from which all values are 
derived. 
2) The spiritual relationship between humans and God •. Here, 
it is presumed that humans have a will and a conscience of 
32. Ibid., p 22. 
33. Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal 
Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, Cambridge 
University Press, 1966, pp. 21-22. 
15 
their own and have a capacity for rights and duties and 
power to enter into contracts. 
3) The normative relationship between one human and another. 
This reiationship is conceived in terms of the law provided 
by God through His perfect knowledge, but applied by the 
imperfect knowledge of humans. 
4) In terms of non-normative relationships with the world of 
matter, appearances and circumstances. 34 
In relation to these four levels of meaning, Shari'a belongs 
to level 1, whereas fiqh covers levels 2 & 3. Social change 
occurs at level 3 and only has an effect on the relationship 
between humans and God at level 2 in an indirect manner. 
Both the adaptability and the immutability viewpoints 
16 
confuse levels 1 and 3. They either reduce Shari'a to figh 
(adaptability-view) or elevate fiqh to the level of Shari'a 
(immutability-view). A careful distinction between the two 
levels is necessary in order to make sense of the 
35 Shari'a/figh process • 
Rahman also raises the vexing problem that if the Shari'a is 
described as a "comprehensive principle of a total way of 
life" how is it known?. 36 By maintaining the distinctions I 
have made above, one can confidently say that the Shari'a is 
known through fiqh. 37 But can also say that Shari'a does 
exist outside fiqh. In the words of al-Azmeh, fiqh "is the 
34. Ibid. 
35. I prefer to use the word Shari'a process rather than 
Shari'a because I have sufficiently laboured to distinguish 
it from figh. THe significance of this neologism is to 
indicate the effect of a religious law. 
36. Fazlur Rahman, Islam, Chicago~ 1966, p. 101. 
37. Masud, op.cit.,.p. 23 
domain of legislation" while Shari'a "is the utopia that. 
part~ally inspires it in very determinate ways that are 
various and open to inquiry." 38 Kerr's leveis of meaning and 
the linguistic insights of Shari'a gives us the elements'to 
theorize the Shari'a as "a metaphysical reality known 
through the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet." 39 Figh 
is then the tangible and practical product of the minhaj 
referred to in the text of the Qur'an. 
What is then regarded as the corpus of Islamic law, is in 
reality figh, arid not the Divine Shari'a. In so doing the 
Divine Will remains immutable, while in pursuance of 
convenience and efficacy figh is open and flexible. It is 
with this attitude in mind that Rahman says that "whatever 
the Muslim 'understood' of God's Shari'a, he would naturally 
regard as his attempt at Din", 40 i.e. an attempt to follow 
the primordial religion in an imperfect manner. It would 
thus be preposterous to claim an understanding of the 
Shari'a as the Shari'a from God for "it is up to God to know 
whether it is really Shari'a, i.e. His will, or not." 41 
Fiqh is the appropriation of reality by,means of an. 
approximation. Simply put, figh is the product of the human 
endeavour to realise the Divine will in probable terms, not 
absolutely. Shari'a is the ideal, the utopia. But even 
utopia is not beyond ideologisation. In the words of Al-
Azmeh: "Utopia is a social and ideblogical fact from which 
the Shari'a cannot escape." 42 
38. al-Azmeh, op. cit., p. 250. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Rahman, op.cit., p. 102. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Al-Azmeh, op.cit. 
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Historical excursus 
As alluded to earlier, the social context to a large extent 
influences juristic thinking and practice. This includes the 
political context in particular. 
By way of example I will demonstrate how fiqh, derived from 
the Shari'a sources, adapted to social and historical 
changes during the earliest period of Islam. ·umar,_ the 
second Caliph of Islam, refused to distribute vast tracts of 
land gained by military conquest - ghanima - among those who 
fought in the conquest of Egypt and Iraq. This ostensibly 
went against the explicit and obvious meaning of the text of 
the Qur'an, 8:41, 43 regarding ghanima. Defending his policy-
- 44 decision, ·umar appealed to the spirit of 59:6-10 and a 
43. The text of the Qur'an reads: 
Know that, whatever booty [ghanima] you take, the fifth 
of it is God's, and the Messenger's, and the near 
kinsman's, and the orphan's, and for the needy, and the 
traveller, if you believe in God and that We sent down 
upon Our servant ••. [Arberry's translation. Insert mine] 
44. The text of the Qur'an reads: 
Whatsoever spoils of war[~] God has given to His 
Messenger from the people of the cities belongs to God, 
and His Messenger, and the near kinsman, orphans,-the 
needy and the traveller, so that it be not a thing 
taken in turns among the rich of you. Whatever the 
Messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, 
give over. And fear God; surely God is terrible in 
retribution. It is for the poor emigrants, who were 
expelled from their habitations and their possessions, 
seeking bounty from God and good pleasure, and helping 
God and His Messenger; those - they are the truthful 
ones. And those who made their dwelling in the abode, 
and in belief, before them, love whosoever has 
emigrated to them, not finding in their breasts any 
need for what they have been given, and preferring 
others above themselves, even though poverty be their 
portion. And whoso guarded against the avarice of his 
own soul, those - they are the prosperers.And as fo~ 
those who came after them, they say, 'Our Lord, forgive 
us and our brothers, who preceded us in belief, and put 
Thou not into our hearts any rancour towards those who 
believe. Our Lord, surely Thou art the All-gentle, the 
All-compassionate. [Arberry's translation. Insert mine] 
principle contained therein which deals with the 
distribution of property gained by peaceful means, known as 
fay'. He linked the two verses, using the latter to qualify 
the former and argued that 59:6-10 prevents the accumulation 
and monopoly of wealth among one group of people. In the 
words of the Qur'an, the spoils of war must "be not a thing 
taken in turns among the rich of you". 
Instead of distributing the urban and rural lands of Egypt 
and Iraq among the soldiers as booty, he imposed a land-tax 
called kharaj on those who owned agricultural land as well 
as a poll-tax called jizya on non-Muslim subjects living in 
the new frontiers of the Islamic state. 
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One notes that 'Umar deduced a legal ruling from a source or 
indicant of the Shari'a, a verse of the Qur'an. A 
superficial reading of his judgement might lead to the 
conclusion that he had failed to implement the letter of a 
Qur'anic ordinance. However, on reflection his judgement 
seems to have taken into consideration the social context in 
which the law had to be enforced in the interest of the 
public weal - maslaha. 45 
Later jurists, using different legal theories, differed on 
the same case treated by ·umar. Al-Shafi', supported by his 
student Ahmad bin Hanbal, argued that conquered land must be 
distributed among the army. 'Umar's action, he said, 
primarily derives its legitimacy· from the fact that the 
people waived their right to booty and not because of his 
creative interpretation of the verses. Despite al-Shafi's 
45. Al-Khinni, op.cit., p. 122. 
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retrospective to rationalization of his own legal theory the 
question still remains whether the text can be set aside if 
the people waived their rights in all cases. Malik ibn Anas, 
the jurist of Madina, was of the opinion that such land 
should not be distributed among the soldiers. However, if it 
is in the public interest it may be divided among the 
46 
army • Abu Hanifa argued that the ruler has the prerogative 
in such matters. 47 
Noting the differences in just one legal ruling it becomes 
clear that different sets of legal theories are implicitly 
at work in the interpretations. To what extent these legal· 
theories are a product of the social context is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. This would then suffice to show that 
the differences in legal theory consistently gave rise,to 
different legal ordinances known as figh. In the above 
example, al-Shafi', Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Abu Hanifa, and Malik 
deduced at times both similar and contrasting Shari'a rules 
- ahkham al-shari'yya - from their detailed sources. 
One of the reasons for diversity is because law is part of a 
social-context where a range of influences are at work. And, 
in this social-context power and authority invariably have 
an effect on the legal process. Hence, we find an 
interlocking network between law, power and political 
authority. 
The twentieth century European scholar, Joseph Schacht, 
points out that at a particular stage of Abbassid rule (749 
46. Ibn Rushd, Bidayatul Mujtahid, vol 2, p. 401. 
47. Al-Khinni, op. cit., p. 69. 
to 1051) there was a move for state control over the law. 
While this was nothing more than a phase, "orthodox Islam 
refused to be drawn into too close a connexion (sic) with 
the state 11 • 48 The subsequent history of the relations 
between Islamic law and political power demonstrate that the 
governors, sultans and caliphs had considerable powers to 
dismiss and replace judges and magistrates - qadis49 . In 
some way the Abbassids did exercise some influence over the 
executive arm of the judiciary and the unofficial jurists. 
These attempts at political manipulation had significant 
consequences. 
Several jurists refused to take up official posts or 
resisted attempts by the governors to adopt their texts and 
writings as the official code and practice of the 
government. Abu Hanifa refused to become the chief justice 
of the Abbassid state. Some historians even link his death 
by poisoning to his political disagreement with the state. 
Malik ibn Anas turned down Harun al-Rashid's offer to allow 
his al-Muwatta, a digest of Hadith ordinances which record 
the positive law, to be made the official textbook for the 
judicial administration of the state. Although research into 
the dynamics of resistance and co~operation with the various 
dynastic states has not shed much light on the matter, it is 
generally assumed that the 'ulama were suspicious of the 
designs of the state. Yet, one finds that some jurists in 
the era prior to the Abbassids had good relations with the 
rulers, particularly during the reign of the Ummayyads. Ibn 
48. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, p. 56. 
49. Ibid. 
21 
Shihab al-Zuhri,· (d. ·124/742) a famous Traditionist, had 
close relations with Ibrahim ibn al-Walid, the ruler at the 
Ummayyad court. It is believed that even though al-Zuhri's 
fiercest critics could not attribute any impious motive for 
his links to the royal court, "he could not gainsay the. 
official circles". 50 .At times, ostensibly for reasons of 
state stability, many 'ulama justified their links with the 
imperial courts of their times. Despite Abu Hanifa's refusal 
to serve the Abbassids in an official capacity, his most 
brilliant and influential student, Abu Yusuf, (d. 182/798), 
became chief gadi (chief justice) of the Abbassid Empire 
under Harun al-Rashid. 51 He was also the author of a major 
work on taxation, known as the kitab al-kharaj. 
It must not be taken for granted that legal texts were 
chiefly written as scholastic exercises. While this may be 
true for some, many texts were commentaries on society at 
. 
large. As Humphreys notes: "At all periods there were 
multitudes of legal writings which meant to address current 
political, socia~ and economic issues." 52 
Obviously the fiqh developed by Muslims reflected the socio-
political milieu in which jurists were working. If some 
juristic positions favoured state patronage then there were 
also other opinions opposed to it. Ibn Taymiyya, the Hanbali 
jurist and political theorist (661-1262/ 728-1328), 
introduced a new brand of juridico-political thought 
criticizing the political authorities, his contemporaries 
50. Rahman, Islam, p. 49, citing Gdldziher. 
51. Humphreys, op. cit., p. 198. 
52. Ibid., p. 194. 
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and previous jurists. There can be little doubt that his 
intellectual and legal writings were provoked by his 
context. The schools of law themselves emerged from a. 
turbulent battlefield of ideas. Of course the balance 
between realism and idealism varies between schools and 
individual scholars. 
Conclusion 
I have argued, that the Shari'a is a utopian ideal but that 
Islamic law, and more specifically fiqh, is open and 
-
flexible. This flexibility does not affect the immutability 
of the Shari'a. It has to be noted that there is a 
dialectical relationship between, what I have coined, the 
Shari'a/fiqh process and the socio-political milieu in which 
it operates. It is indeed problematic to say that the 
Shari'a/fiqh process determines the social milieu or vice-
versa. However, it is valid to argue that the Shari'a/fiqh 
process has never been totally independent of the socio-
political forces. Irrespective of whether the Shari'a/fiqh 
process is viewed as open and flexible or close and static, 
it will in any event have a relationship with the socio-
political process.But, in each instance there will be 
significant differences in the relationship. 
Figh can play a vital role in providing Muslims with a 
value-system rooted in their spiritual and ethical culture 
if it is understood as a dynamic system. However, if the 
distinction between Shari'a and fiqh is not maintained it 
could lead to a stasis and the absolutizing of the law. In 
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such an eventuality the social relevance of the law may 
increasingly be questioned. 
In the following chapter, I will go on to show that MPL can· 
become a vehicle for despotic repression at the level of 
both state and civil society. I have tried to show that the 
interpretations and tensions within Islamic law 
historically-speaking have political roots in addition to 
their other roots. If the content of MPL and the mechanics 
for implementing it do not take into account the socio-
political realities of South Africa there is a danger that. 
MPL will become repressive instead of liberating. In order 
to show this, I will deal in the next chapter with the 
impact that ideology and liberation has on the debate on 
MPL. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Law, Ideology, State and the Muslim 'subject' 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the concept of Shari'a was explored 
where it was stated that the distinction between the Shari'a 
and fiqh should be maintained. While Shari'a is absolute at 
one level, at the level of implementation it is flexible. 
History shows that the understanding of the Shari'a/fiqh 
process in its social context has often been influenced by 
socio-political developments. It was also concluded by way 
of suggestion that MPL faces this danger of being subject to 
a ruling political ideology. 
Here the analysis will focus on the creation of a Muslim 
'subject• 1 in order to show how a ruling political ideology 
may affect MPL. The possible implementation of MPL as 
proposed by the South African Law Commission (SALC) raises 
certain important questions related to the socio-political 
implications it would have on both the ~uslim community in 
particular, and the process of liberation in South Africa in 
general. 
1. I use the word 'subject' in its specialized sense as one 
who had been interpellatetl by an ideological process. See 
further discussion below. 
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If there is a desire to establish an authoritative and 
contextual implementation of MPL then the methodological 
tools to do so ought to be developed. Due recognition must 
be given to the fact that religious symbols and doctrines 
play an important part in the ideological discourse examined 
here. The link between the problem in legal theory (see 
chapter one) and the political discourses discussed in this 
chapter is established in order to locate the contextual 
discourse of Muslims in South Africa. It is not sufficient 
only to expose the dominant political ideology but the 
groundwork for an alternative discourse and hermeneutic must 
also be explored. 
For some theoretical tools of analysis in this chapter I 
have relied largely on the nee-Marxian interpretation of law 
and ideology which borrows some of its seminal ideas from 
the influential French thinker, Louis Althusser. Some of 
these concepts are complex and form an interlocking 
argument. It is for this reason that some concepts and terms 
are first outlined and will be applied in the analytical 
part of this chapter. 
Discourse, Ideology and Law 
It is appropriate to begin with a discussion of discourse. A 
discursive relationship is a power relationship.'In addition 
to whatever else it might be, language forms the central 
part of human communication and the most effective medium in 
which power relations are formed. It is through discourse 
' . 
that ideological control is effected on subjects. Law as an 
apparatus is linked to the discursive process. 
Althusser, believes that ideology is promoted by the 
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) ..• 
insofar as the ideology by which they function is 
always in fact united, despite its diversity and its 
contradictions, beneath the ruling2ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class. 
By this we understand that ideology is not a unitary entity. 
To understand-the role of ideology in law the focus should 
be on the nature of discourse - its continuities and 
discontinuities - and to trace the resonances of the social; 
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economic, and political struggles that "reside behind the 
smooth surface of legal reasoning and judicial utterance". 3 
Ideology in terms of such reasoning is realized through and 
in social relations which in turn are constructed through 
discourse. 4 
Institutions and apparatuses like the army, courts, law, the 
state church and the state religion ensures "subjection to 
the ruling ideology". In this process all the agents of 
2. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and the Ideological State 
Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in Lenin and 
Philosophy, (trans. Ben Brewster), London, New Left Books, 
1971, p. 139. 
3. Allan Hunt, "The Ideology of Law: Advance and Problems in 
Recent applications of the Concept of Ideology to the 
Analysis of Law", Law & Society Review, 19:1, 1985, p. 16. 
4. Mohamed Arkoun in an essay titled: "The Concept of 
authority in Islamic Thought", in Islam: State and Society, 
Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari, (eds) Studies on Asian 
Topics No 12, Scandinavian Institute of ASian Studi8s, 
Curzon Press, London 1988, p. 68 says •.• 
In the past, ideologies existed, but have been 
eliminated or criticized under the name of sects, 
heresies and religious error. The hard and suggestive 
polemic between Sunni and Shi'i is an excellent example 
of the ideological basis of theological reason. Only 
the modern critic of ideologies can show that each 
orthodoxy is ultimately founded on ideological 
postulates. 
production, exploitation and repression and the 
functionaries or 'high priests' of the ruling ideology, 
reproduce the 'subjection' to the ruling ideology. 
In analysing the relationship between law and ideology 
Althusser distinguishes between the politico-legal field 
which includes law and the state, known as the Repressive 
State Apparatuses (RSAs) and the variety of religious, 
ethical, legal and political ideologies, known as the 
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) 5 Since the ISAs and 
RSAs constitute a whole range of activities, the discourses 
will also be multiple. 
The Subject 
The notion of a 'subject' in the Althusserian scheme is 
created through a variety of discourses. The subject(s) of, 
ideology are discursively constituted through 
interpellation. According to Althusser, interpellation is 
that process of summoning (hailing) individuals so that by 
recognising themselves to be the ones summoned, they are 
transformed as subjects of a universal Subject. The subjects 
misrecognise the process by which they are constituted by 
accepting the self-evidentness (obviousness) of their 
position. 6 In other words, the subjects accept the variety 
of influences that govern their actions without questioning 
in whose interests they actually do so. For example, a 
policeman signalling a motorist to stop or saying a prayer 
at the opening of a public meeting may both be seen as law-
5. Ibid., p. 129. 
6. Althusser, op.cit., p. 161. 
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abiding and religious acts if they were complied to 
uncritically. If these acts are uncritically performed it 
could lead to a situation where the motorist stopping and 
praying could mean more than what both acts actually pretend 
to signi~y. The motorist may believe he is stopping fo~ an 
alleged traffic offence but his act could be more 
significant in that he may be legitimating an illegitimate 
political authority by obeying the policeman. Or, the prayer 
may ostensibly be for spiritual upliftment but the devotee 
may in reality be satisfying an ideological impulse which 
he/she may not at all be happy about if it was not 
ideologically disguised in religious language. 
Ideology represents for individuals their imaginary 
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relations as opposed to their real relations in which they 
live 7 and in so doing hails them as subjects. The 
"imaginary" does not mean "illusory" or "false" in the 
Althuserrian sense, but rather the "relation" to the 
material conditions of existence. Ideology gives us the 
world as "spontane6us". The subject acts insofar ass/he "is 
8 acted by ideology". It means that individuals are "always-
already" interpellated as subjects. It was Althusser who 
9 
said: 'Man is an ideological animal by nature'. However, 
ideology does not say out aloud: 'I am ideological'. What 
an analysis of subjectivity provides is a heightened 
sensitivity to the manipulative skills of power relations 
for the possession and control of the material conditions of 
7. Althusser, op.cit., pp. 153-154. 
8. Althusser, op.cit., p. 159. 
9. Ibid. 
existence. In a sense all discourse is ideological. In 
revolutionary societies, the discourse ideally favours the 
under-classes in order that they may establish direct 
possession and management over the material con?itions of 
their existence. Control over the material conditions of 
existence is not easily achieved and at best remains the 
privilege of a few. 
State and the Law 
The state is best described as a complex reality. Crucial to 
this analysis is the role of the ISAs which operate at 
different levels and appear as private institutions such as 
the Church, the legal system, the schools, the media, the 
trade unions, the political parties etc. 1° For our purposes 
the state is best described as a shifting complex of 
structures which involves a whole range of ideological and 
repressive institutions. In its complexity the array of 
apparatuses are united in the constitution of an ideological 
hegemony in the social formation. 11 . 
Law is close to the state, yet distinct from it. In other 
words, it has a relative autonomy to be an ISA while its 
proximity to the state also makes it an RSA. Hegemonic 
control of the ISAs is vital since no ruling-class can hold 
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state power without exercising at the same time its hegemony 
over the ISAs. 12 It is for this reason, more than any 
10. Ibid., p. 136. 
11. Harold Wolpe, "Towards an Analysis of the South African 
State", International Journal of the Sociology of Law, vol 
8, 1980. 
12. Ibid., p. 139. 
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other, that the ISAs are the "site of class struggle" or 
the sites of struggle for ideological hegemony on the part 
of both the state and its opponents. 
The state maintains hegemonic control by creating a 
situation of unequal relationship. The political discourse 
interpellates the individual to create the facade of an 
equal "citizen" 14 while the legal discourse trartsforms both 
human beings and social entities, like companies, into 
"legal subjects"· 15 The common ~lement between the political 
discourse and the legal discourse is that both interpellate 
their subjects. 
Hunt's statement on the interpellation of the legal subject 
adequately explains this phenomenon and deserves full 
replication ... 
The creation of legal subjects involves the 
recognition of "the law" as the active "subject" 
that calls them into being. It is by transforming 
the human subject into a legal subject that law 
influences the way in which participants 
experience and perceive their relations with 
others. Thus legal ideology provides a constituent 
of what Althu~ier called the "lived relation" of 
human actors. · 
Seen in this way ideology is not only an external mechanism 
but, a "constituent of the unconscious in which social 
relations are lived". 17 Ideology through the state 
apparatuses constructs a 'subject' with certain 
characteristics that sustain the hegemonic function of the 
state. 
13. Ibid., p. 140. 
14. Hunt, op.cit., p. 15. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Hunt,op.cit., p. 16. 
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As part of the ideological process the discourse of MPL will 
be investigated in terms of 'subjectivity', in this 
specialized sense, and the relationship between the state 
and law in the political process. 
Background to MPL: Tne SA Law Commission's Proposal 
Towards the close of 1987 the South African Law Commission 
(SALC) circulated a questionnaire to several Muslim 
organisations and individuals soliciting their opinion on 
certain matters affecting MPL. The motivating introduction 
to the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) stated ... 
The South African Law Commission is presently 
engaged in an investigation into certain aspects 
of Islamic marriages 1~d their legal consequences in South African Law. 
Representations for the recognition of MPL in recent times 
go back some 10 years. In 1975, the Director of the 
Institute of Islamic Shari'a Studies made. representations to 
the then Prime Minister, BJ Vorster, that aspects of 
Islamic law relating to divorce, succession and guardianship 
be recognised. At the time the SALC was ... 
unwilling to include the investigation in its 
programme, firstly, because it was of the opinion 
that the recognition of the relevant aspects of 
Islamic law could lead to confusion in South 
African law and, secondly, because the existing 
rules of South African law do not prohibit a 
Muslim from living in accor£gnce with the relevant 
directions of Islamic law. 
The SALC has as yet not given any satisfactory explanation 
as to what had substantively changed in 1987 that it had 
decided to entertain Muslim demands. Neither did it explain 
18. South African Law Commission, Islamic Marriages and 
Related Matters, Project 59 (Questionnaire), p (i). 
19. Ibid., p. (ii) 
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how it did away with the feared "confusion" MPL would cause 
in SA law. 
The SALC tries to make a coherent case for its renewed 
interest in Islamic law by trying to create a continuity 
between previous Muslim representations and a number of its 
own current inquiries. The inquiry into MPL is seen to be 
part of an investigation into the position of: 
1) illegitimate children [Project 38] 
2) marr'iages and customary unions of Black persons [Project 
51]; 
3) a review of the law of evidence [Project 6] 
4) the law of intestate succession [Project 22]. 20 " 
5) The SALC also took cognisance of a private Bill by Mr PT 
Poovalingam MP (House of Delegates) who wanted to introduce 
legislation in 1987 which "grant some form of recognition· to 
the Islamic law of succession". 21 
Muslim Responses to the Questionnaire 
Mus~im. responses to this SALC questionnaire varied f,rom a 
_ feverish welcome to outright rejections. The conservative 
·u1ama-bodies of the three provinces - the Muslim Judicial 
Council (MJC) of the Cape, the Jamiat ul-'Ulama of the 
Transvaal, the Jamiat ul-'Ulama of Natal, as well as the 
Mujlisul 'Ulama of South Africa and the Islamic Council of 
South Africa (ICSA), have all made submissions to the SALC 
20. Ibid., p. (ii) 
21. Ibid., p. (ii) 
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as far as it could be ascertained. Other than the 'ulama, 
the Association of Muslim Accountants and Lawyers (AMAL) is 
also believed to have submitted its response to the 
questionnaire. The 'ulama bodies announced the MPL proposal 
with near-jubilation. In a pamphlet 22 the 'ulama said: 
For many years since the arrival of Islam in South 
Africa, Muslims have been yearning for the 
introduction of Islamic Law in some form or 
another to govern their affairs. Various 
approaches have been made to the relevant 
authorities in the past but without any measure of 
success ... We pray and hope for the co-operation of 
all Muslims in this endeavour and hope that it 
will not be long before we shall see Muslim 
Personal Law as part of 2tJie legal system of the Republic of South Africa~ 
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On the opposite front the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) in its 
monthly mouthpiece, Al-Qalam (The Pen), seems to have been 
cautious with regard to MPL. Al-Qalam warned Muslims that 
_the Botha government faced a "legitimacy crisis·~ and was 
thus desperate to politically "co-optll willi_ng elements 
among Muslims by means of MPL. 24 The Call of Islam, a Cape 
Town-based group, also voiced its reservations about the 
25 issue in a pamphlet. 
The MYM admitted that severe problems were being experienced 
at a community level in matters such as arbitrary divorces, 
the lack of adequate maintenance for children and divorcees. 
However, it was contentious whether these problems could be 
22. Announcement: Muslim Personal Law, pamphlet issued by 
the Secretary, Central Committee, 'Ulama of South Africa. 
(See Appendix.) 
23. Ibid. 
24. Al-Qalam, Comment, "Muslim Personal Law: Quo Vadis'?" 
February 1988, vol 13, pp. ·1-2. 
25. "Ask the Ummah!", undated pamphlet issued by The Call of 
Islam. A part of it read ... 
we must not and will not allow them [the state] to use 
our Personal Law to control and co-opt us ... 
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overcome by legislation in the form of MPL. The Al-Qalam 
editorial called on Muslims to unite and discuss the issue 
and declared itself in favour of Muslim organisations 
setting up structures independent of the state to administer 
MPL. 
A short-lived MPL Action Committee was also formed in the 
We.stern Cape. The aim of this body was to create awareness 
at a grassroots level to monitor the action of various 
'Ulama groups who were privately entertaining the MPL 
proposal without public consultation. In the Western Cape 
the 'ulama were charged of taking decisions without a public 
mandate by several community organisations. This was largely 
due to the MJC's failure to inform the community about 
discussions held with the SALC or joint agreements reached 
with other 'ulama groups in the Transvaal and Natal 
regarding the MPL proposal. 
The absence of public debate on a politically sensitive 
issue such as MPL does cause reason for concern among 
politically aware Muslims. The Action Committee's main 
' 
criticism was that the 'ulama were willing to respond to the 
SALC questionnaire without cpnsidering the far-reaching 
political implications of their decision may have. The MJC 
was pressed by the Action Committee to explain their co-
operation with a para-statal body like the SALC and outline 
their political strategy with regard to the state, if MPL 
was to become a reality. The MJC's oral reply was that the 
Treaty of Hudaibiya undertaken between the Prophet Muhammad 
in seventh century Arabia and his Makkan political enemies 
served as a precedent for co-operation with an unjust 
regime. That implied that co-operation with the apartheid 
state was possible provided such co-operation served the 
vital interests of the Muslims. 26 
The ultra-conservative Port Elizabeth-based Mujlisul 'Ulama 
of South Africa in its contribution to the debate made a 
scathing attack on an unidentified "Co-Ordinating Committee 
of Johannesburg" for allegedly urging Muslims and the 'ulama 
bodies to refrain from answering the questionnaire. The 
Mujlisul 'Ulama described the content of the questionnaire 
to b~ related to "important matters affecting the Deeni 
(religious) life of Muslims in South Africa." 27 It further 
advocated that Muslim organisations should answer the 
questionnaire in consultation with the 'ulama, whom it said 
enjoyed the status of the 'ulul-amr, the people of 
authority, in the Muslim community. 28 
Two individual responses to the MPL proposal, that of 
Professor Habibul Haq Nadvi, Head of the Department of 
Arabic at the University of Durban Westville and advocate A 
B Mohamed of an ICSA spokesman from Durban, both recommend 
that the government recognize MPL in SA. 29 Nadvi believes 
that the "difficulties of Muslims in this country can be 
26. This author was part of the delegation that met the MJC 
early in 1988. The information regarding the MPL Action 
Committee was gathered after attending meetings held by the 
Action Committee in various Cape Town mosques during the 
first part of 1988. The MJC's spokespersons at the meeting 
attended included its president, Sheikh Nazeem Mohamed and 
Moulana Yusuf Karaan, who heads the MJC's fatwa committee. 
27. Pamphlet issued by the Mujlisul 'Ulama of South Africa, 
dated 5 January 1988, PO Box 3393, PE. (See Appendix) 
28. See Appendix 2. 
29. S. Habibul Haq Nadvi, Problems of Safeguarding Muslim 
Personal Law in South Africa, a published working paper 
submitted to the SALC in response to their questionnaire, 29 
February 1988.; AB Mohamed, Human Science Research Council 
Section for Political Science Research, Research Project -
Muslim Law, Ref. No 3/10/121. 1984. 
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removed only through official recognition of the Muslim 
Personal Law" 30 AB Mohamed proposes the establishment of 
Muslim Family Courts. 31 The qadis (judges and magistrates) 
of these courts are to be appointed by the State President32 
on the recommendation of the judicial committee of the 
Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA). 33 Both studies 
oversimplify the matter and propose legislation as the 
solution. They also fail to address some of the more 
pressing socio-poli.tical issues linked to the implementation 
of MPL. 
_Analysing the Discourses: The State Discourse 
The assertion that MPL is a problem in political discourse 
is supported by the opinion expressed by the Centre for 
Islamic Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU). The 
discourse can be traced to the moment when certain Muslim 
groups publicly criticised the Centre for convening a 
discrete conference to which only a very selected audience 
of local Muslims were invited. Those invited included only 
members of the two 'ulama-bodies in the Transvaal and Natal 
and two Durban-based Muslim academics. The Al-Qalam, the 
publication of the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), came close 
to describing the conference as suspect and implicitly made 
the point that only perso~s favorably disposed towards the 
South African' state qualified for an invitation. Since the 
30. Nadvi, op. cit., p. 5. 
31. Mohamed, op. cit. p. 93. 
32. Ibid., p. 118. 
33. Early in 1988, a meeting hosted by the Muslim Assembly, 
an affiliate of !CSA, ended in pandemonium when the chair 
person, Dr H Kotwal refused to entertain questions dealing 
with the political dimensions of the MPL proposal. 
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issue affected all Muslims in South Africa a representative 
cross-section of the community ought to have been consulted 
in discussions of such a sensitive and significant na.ture. 
In response to these criticisms, an editorial in the 
Centre's Journal for Islamic Studies, following the said 
"international conference" held in July 1988, titled, 
Islamic Law and the Modern Sate, the Centre with the 
advantage of hindsight outlined the objective of the 
conference. 
The conference was meant to give some perspective 
in academic context to an investigation of the Law 
Commission of South Africa into the possibility3if introducing Islamic Family Law in this country. 
However, the opinion following the description of the 
conference deserves attention. The Journal accused a "small 
group" of Muslim "radicals" of "false propaganda" and 
"disgraceful" behaviour for their criticism of the 
conference. The criticism appeared to have been more 
specifically directed at the MYM for its vociferous 
criticism of the Centre in the Al-Qalam. But in responding 
to the criticisms levelled at it, the Centre disclosed more 
than what it had thus far managed to conceal. Its discourse 
impficitly distanced itself from a group of Muslims, "the 
radicals" who were overtly political. At the same time it 
implied the Centre's association with those Muslims who were 
not political. In other words, those who were favorably 
disposed.towards the status quo, namely the Transvaal and 
Natal Jamiats. 
34. Journal for Islamic Studies, no 8, 1988 (ed) J A Naude, 
Centre for Islamic Studies, Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), 
Johannesburg. 
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A subsequent Al-Qalam editorial observed that the Centre's 
discourse shared a striking resonance with the dominant 
state discourse against Muslims. 35 Such ~iscourse implicitly 
tended to take sides with a specific group of Muslims after 
it had characterised the 'Muslim subject' in a manner 
befitting the self-interest of the dominant, the Al-Qalam 
said. In taking sides the discourse makes a conscious 
distinction between "radical" and allegedly law-abiding 
Muslims36 and shows. a bias towards one. 
If the above discourse is juxtaposed alongside a statement 
made by President PW Botha in Parliament in April 1986, · 
certain striking parallels are found. It highlights the main 
elements of the state discourse vis-a-vis 'radical' Muslims. 
It also reveals the state's political assessment of the 
Muslim community. The context of Botha's 1986 statement was 
the arrest of an insurgent group entering South Africa from 
Botswana which included a few persons of the Islamic faith. 
Identifying the Muslim elements among the insurgents, Botha 
told Parliament ... 
As you are aware we have a large Muslim community 
who, like all other religious denominations, enjoy 
complete freedom of religion. Furthermore, you 
also know that South ~frican Muslims are respected 
citizens. However, a small group has emerged 
within this community who, under the influence of 
Libya, Iran and with funding from these quarters, 
have committed themsel~, with the ANC and PAC, 
to terror and violence .. 
In his discourse Botha constructs two Muslim 'subjects'. The 
one is the "respected citizen" which is law-abiding and does 
35. Al-Qalam, November-December 1988, Editorial, "Blaming 
the Victims", p 8. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Republic of South Africa, Debates of the House of 
Assembly, Hansard, Third Session - Eighth Parliament, 14-18 
April, 1986, No. 10, p3590. 
not offer resistance to the state and its ideological 
apparatuses. The second 'subject' is a "small group" 
described as 'radical' which is linked to Iran and Libya who 
are ~een dubbed as pariah states in the Western- world. 
Disguised in this discourse is the state's own version of 
'the Muslim'(respected citizen) to which it is favorably 
predisposed. Opposed to this group is another type of 
'Muslim' ( small gro_up/ radical). In the ordinary sense of 
speech and media-reporting the attempt at constructing the 
monolithic Muslim 'subject' - the Law-abiding Muslim or 
'good subject' - is not always noticeable for the focus is 
directed at the radical, the 'bad subject'. 
Botha spelt out the state's modus operandi of dealing with 
the radicals ..• 
I have already issued instructions in this regard 
and our security and intelligence 3§ervices are taking necessary countermeasures. (emphasis 
mine) 
The discourse of the Centre for Islamic Studies at RAU 
echoes the state's discourse in stunningly identical terms 
and gives it further currency. Note the Journal's editorial 
tone towards its critics, the 'bad subject' ... 
38. Ibid. 
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That the idea of this conference was drawn into 
the field of politics by a small group outside 
those mentioned, is something they have to account 
for themselves ... radicals are weak, but seek 
strength in their extremism. They feed on conflict 
images and rej ectionism, and seek a solution in 
the absolute, in total confrontation rather than 
in negotiation for a better future. There is after 
all little challenge in working destruction; any 
ignoramu~9 with a hammer in his hand can create 
chaos... (emphasis mine) 
There are noticeable continuities in the discourse of the 
Centre and that of the state. They mutually reinforce the 
same discursive pattern, one as an ISA - an educational 
institution like RAU, and the other as the head of state. 
The noticeable absence (discontinuities) is that although 
the conference was titled "Muslim Law and the Modern State", 
not a single paper dealt with the modern South African 
state. No analysis or discussion of the political 
relationship between MPL and the modern South African state 
was entertained at the conference. In fact the Centre's 
discourse encourages "negotiation" in a reformist approach 
and at the same time tries to criminalize the radicals and 
deprive them of social legitimacy. 
The 'Ulama's Discourse 
Similarly, the discourse of the 'ulama implies the 
characterization of a Muslim subject of a 'universal' 
nature. The hidden text of such discourse is the 
41 
understanding that there is one uniform Muslim subject which 
the 'ulama authoritatively interprets. The implication of 
this assertion is that the Muslim masses cannot represent 
themselves individually or collectively. They are to be 
39. Journal for Islamic Studies, "Editorial", p. 2. 
represented by the 'ulama. Historically the 'ulama claim to 
be the custodians of religious authority of a "precise 
dogmatic expression". 40 Anything opposed to this expression 
runs the risk of being termed heterodox since it disputes 
religious authority in terms of the interpretation and 
d f 1 . . t. 41 sprea o re igious prac ice. 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that orthodoxy is a 
monolithic unit. Ai times there is often a tacit assumption 
says Christelow, that ... 
"the 'ulama are a sort of timeless, invariable fixture 
in the Islamic world, and that, similarly, the Islamic 
institutions which they staff are unchanging over time, 
and invar!~ble in their form from one setting to 
another." · 
The notion of a monolithic category of 'ulama has 
increasingly and correctly been challenged. In South Africa 
this class of the traditional Muslim elite vary from one 
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province to the other differing on the basis of theological 
and scholastic loyalties, ethnicity, political and cultural 
differences. Despit~ their inherent differences they have in 
common a consistent claim to religious authority by virtue 
of their religious status. It in this sense that the 'ulama 
is used as equivalent to the term orthodoxy43 
40. Aziz al -Azmeh,. "Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism", 
Arabica, xxxv, 1988, p. 253. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Allan Christelow, "The Transformation of the Muslim 
Court System in Colonial Algeria: Reflections on the Concept 
of Autonomy", in Islamic Law, (ed) Al-Azmeh, p. 217. 
43. Al-Azmeh describes orthodoxy as an "intangible quality" 
and defines it as ... 
an attribute of all religious authority, an attribute 
which acquires veracity to the extent to which it can 
be made binding and paradigmatic and to the degree to 
which it can be consolidated, enforced, and endowed 
with the capacity for dissemination and 
continuity.(Arabica, xxxv, 1988, p. 253). 
The statement of the Mujlisul 'Ulama epitomizes this 
attitude when it explicitly states that the 'ulama 
constitutes the 'people of authority'. This means that only 
those who are 'ulama have the exclusive authority to 
interpret the Islamic text. 44 
Anyone who ventures to interpret the text outside the circle 
of the 'ulama is a 'bad subject'. This is precisely the area 
of conflict between orthodoxy, and their rivals in religious 
authority, the modernists, fundamentalists and neo-
fundamentalists. From the viewpoint of orthodoxy, the latter 
heterodox categories or 'bad subjects' can be declared 
heretical or quasi-heretical in discursive terms. In a 
strange coincidence the state also seeks to exercise some 
43 
sort of monopoly over the right to authority. It is the 
state which in Calvinist terms is the locus of authority and 
which legitimates and de-legitimates activities, 
organisations, people and behaviour. There are many 
similarities to be found in the discourse of power/authority 
of the 'ulama and the state in South Africa. 
Leonard Binder's reading of Edward Said's critique of 
orientalism may throw some light on this veiled, but 
effective, ideological alliance between state and orthodox 
Muslim authority. Said states that the defect of orientalism 
is its imputation of a universal character to Islam. In his 
view this is a violent attack on Islam and Muslims in order 
to coerce them into conforming to roles imposed by Western 
44. See Appendix 2. 
44 
45 imperialism. The question raised is whether the 
orientalist critique is inimical to Islam 
because its interpretations have the effect of 
imprisoning the text of the Qur'an rather than 
liberating it. The insistence upori the essential, or 
orthodox, version of Islam in the critique of 
heterodox, or modernist, or fundamentalist Islam, is 
based on the notion that there is one authoritative 
meaning to the text. Consequently, there emerges a kind 
of double repression and violence of the original text 
and of the orientalist critique. Presumably the result 
of this combination of rigidities produces an unnatural 
ideological alliance between the orientalist and the 
traditional 'ulama, not because they have similar 
imperial inter.ests, but because they have similar 
knowledge-interests (as Habermas following Kant may put 
it) in the sa~5 text. The text may be worldly in diverse ways. (emphasis mine) 
Knowledge interests imply power interests through channels 
of authority. It appears that Binder's analysis is valid in 
the South African context. The 'ulama may not have identical 
political interests with the South African state, but their 
"unnatural ideological alliances" with the state and pro-
state actors at certain junctures disclose their knowledge-
interests for purposes of religious authority and power. 
Similarly, the attempt to impute a standard and absolute 
definition of the Muslim in South Africa would enable the 
state to make the Muslim subject conform to certain roles 
which would be in its own ideological interests. 
The Muslim 'subject' is the result of the skilful 
manipulation of legal, religious and ideological symbols. 
But the struggle for ideological hegemony is by no means 
one-sided. The politicised Muslim elite opposed to the state 
find themselves in confrontation with a powerful Muslim 
traditional and ethnic elite. The politically active elite 
45. Leonard 'Binder,Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of 
Development Ideologies, University of Chicago Press, London, 
1988, p. 96. 
46. Ibid. 
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also seek hegemonic control over religious symbols. The 
politicized elite, however, overtly oppose the state. As a 
consequence they cannot disguise their appropriation of 
Islamic symbols as effectively as the traditional and ethnic 
elite do. The rhetorical concerns of the traditional/ethnic 
elite with Islamic legal issues in terms of MPL disguises an 
ideology which tacitly supports the status quo. To the 
advantage of the traditional/ethnic elite is that they 
reinforce their ideological claims with religious symbols 
and authority which are extremely resilient. 
The Politico- Legal Discourse: Constructing the Subject 
Colin Sumner has accurately stated the relationship between 
law and ideology ... 
A legal enactment is a hybrid form combining power 
and ideology ... It originates within legalizing 
practices which are political in that they are 
geared to producing certain specific power 
relations. Once constituted, legal systems do not 
just produce laws, but exist as The Law. An 
ideology of legality dev~lops which celebrates and 
elevates The Law to an exalted status as the 
expression of unity in the nation. It is most 
important to begin the study of the functions of 
ideology of le9jfity in concealing political acts 
and domination. (emphasis mine) 
The argument thus far has been that ideology tries to 
interpellate its subjects in categories of 'good subjects' 
and 'bad subjects'. These ideological categories are 
designed to protect the security and political interests of 
the state which is crucial for hegemony. 48 Without 
separating the 'fish' from the 'sea', to use a Maoist 
metaphor, it is difficult to maintain political control. 
47. Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies, p. 293. 
48. Adrian Vlok, Interview in Leadership, 1987. 
Hence, the need to isolate the "revolutionaries", from the 
community and fulfill the needs of the 'good' citizens in 
terms of providing civic services, housing, jobs and 
institutions that will fulfill their limited religious and 
cultural requirements. 
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By introducing MPL the state stages an ideological 
intervention in the legal field. Ideologically a favourable 
minority (Muslims) is discursively constructed to understand 
its relations of obligation, MPL, in a definitive way and a 
manner approved by the state. By means of effective legal 
organisation the 'Muslim' is interpellated by "the law" and 
transformed into a 'legal subject' like any other legal 
entity, e.g. Anglo-American Corp, IBM etc. This definition 
of the 'Muslim subject' prevails irrespective of whether it 
corresponds with the community's self-defi~ition, as 
explained by its theologians, jurists and intellectuals and 
their worldview. 
The alternative discourse 
It has been argued that a 'subject' is constituted by 
various discourses. Each subject is thus constructed 
differently reducing thereby the possibility of constructing 
all Muslims into subjects. In in effect the interpellatory 
process creates its own contradictions by not being able to 
create a uniform subject. 
A static and acontextualised Shari'a/fiqh process, of which 
MPL is part, is in danger of becoming fixated to a specific 
mode of ideologisation. In contemporary South Africa it 
means that MPL will become ideologised within a racial-
capitalist economic mode. A contextual and open viewpoint of 
the Shari'a/fiqh process would allow MPL to shift its 
ideological compass in tandem with the changing political 
and economic formations in South Africa. It would further 
weaken the exclusive monopoly of one group, be it the 
traditional elite or the state over the law (and indirectly 
over the community) since it would enable public interest 
and the common good to alter the law without major social 
conflict and dislocation. 49 
· From the above it becomes clear that the different notions 
of the Shari'a, discussed in the previous chapter, will 
ultimately determine the extent to which the interpellation 
of a Muslim subject could succeed. A notion of Islamic law 
47 
with gr.9ater flexibility allows it to adapt to both changing 
political and socio-historical circumstances. A closed view 
of the law would facilitate the ideologisation of Islamic 
law with greater ease than what an open and flexible view 
would allow. The open view would invite and maintain a 
debate which would offset and balance attempts at hegemony. 
49. Note the political crises any amendment to MPL 
legislation causes in India. 
The inability of the early imperial Muslim states, the 
Ummayyads and Abbassids, to totally subject the law to serve 
their ideological tendencies did have some positive results. 
It allowed the law t6 develop a dynamism free from the 
strangling griphold of the state. It also gave the law a 
momentum and a rootedness in the affairs of civil society 
since the earliest jurists occupied prominent social. 
Despite the problems Islamic law faces today it is still a 
feasible system. The last mentioned can be attributed to its 
dynamism and organic roots within society. 
No single legal school - madhab - succeeded in dominating 
the Muslim world, except at rare instances. Malik's refusal 
48 
to allow his Madinan interpretation of the law to become the 
dominant is significant in many ways. One explanation might 
be that law is culturally and socially specific. It would be 
unwise to impose a Madinian perspective of the law on 
regions that are non-Arab. In such cases the imposed law may 
conflict with the customary laws and values of the non-Arab 
societies. Each area has its specific socio-economic 
50 formation in which the law would operate differently. 
This type of appreciation of in the study and practice 
Islamic law is found lacking in modern times. 
50. Classical development of commercial law is a superb 
example where a variety of commercial and trade practices 
were sanctioned in different geographical areas which were 
largely based on customary practice. 
Islamic law itself has various layers of discourses which 
are indicative of its mutations through different socio-
historical and economic modes. It is not surprising that 
_, 
today both socialists and capitalists can find texts to 
legitimate their respective positions within the framework 
of Islamic law. 51 This reveals the layers of discourses 
within Islamic law which also reflects its ability to adapt 
to different social contexts. 52 If the Shari'a/fiqh process 
is seen as an open system these mutations and influences 
with the use of critical analysis are easily detectable. If 
it is seen as static and closed then these culturally 
specific socio-economic practices will be absolutised in 
ideology. 
49 
The argument for an open ended Shari'a/figh process has been 
forwarded to prevent MPL from becoming a servant of a 
particular ideology, be it capitalist, socialist or other. 
This would on the one hand ensure that the discursive frame, 
which is in reality the power component, remains within the 
grasp of the populace and does not become the monopoly of 
the state and its repressive and ideological apparatuses. On 
the other hand, Islamic law will be consistent with its 
historical legacy. 
51. See the debate between the Egyptian Marxist writer, 'Abd 
al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and the Shaykh al-Azhar, 'Abd al-Halim 
Mahmud, over the appropriation of the Prophet's companion, 
Abu Dharr, as the first socialist of Islam. (Ulrich Haarman, 
"Abu Dharr - Muhammad's Revolutionary Companion", in The 
Muslim world, vol LXVII, October 1978, No 4, p. 286)~~ 
52. The forms of commercial law espoused during the Umayyad, 
Abbassid and Fatimid caliphates, did not inhibit the 
development of protocapitalist economic activity in the form 
of petty commodity production and mercantile capitalism. See 
Joel Benin, "Islamic Responses to the Capitalist Penetration 
of the Middle East," in The Islamic Impulse, (ed) Barbara 
Freyer Stowasser, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 87; also see 
Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism. 
A Dilemma 
Can the formal autonomy provided by MPL be broadened to 
provide substantive autonomy for the Muslims and other 
members of the disfranchised community in the long-term? Or 
would the acceptance of apartheid-style pluralism legitimise 
the subordinate and subject-status of the Muslims? This 
dilemma of choosing between two options that incorporates 
both pragmatic and strategic considerations for critical 
legal theorists is, in Hunt's words, the "radical 
predicament" 53 . This predicament is linked to two different 
theories of legal analysis. One theory suggests that the 
dominant ideology inheres in specific laws and not the 
entire legal system. If this is correct, then the option of 
seeking gradual autonomy ma~ be viable since the legal 
system still contains other elements that are useful. The 
other theory states that dominant political ideology 
pervades the entire legal system. Accepting or complying 
with any portion of the legal system would imply its 
legitimation. In the end the politics of the law, namely 
50 
strategic and tactical considerations, would determine which 
of the above mentioned two theories are applicable in a 
given instance. 
Denis Davis, drawing on the work of Nicos Poulantzas, 
believes that the "state and the law are shaped by the level 
of intensity of the political struggles within a social 
formation." 54 In his seminal analysis of legal and 
53. Hunt, op. cit., p. 23. 
54. Denis Davis, "Legality and Struggle: Towards a Non-
Instrumentalist View of Law" in Essays on Law and Social 
Practice in South Africa, Juta, Cape Town, 1988, p 82. 
h 
political struggles in South Africa, Davis, following Wolpe 
in periodizing the post-1948 state, points out some 
significant developments in the third phase from 1973 till 
the present. After the 1973 Durban strikes "increased trade 
union activity forced concessions from the state culminating 
in the re-emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition to the 
state." 55 In this case trade union struggles in 1970's 
shaped the nature of popular politics in the 1980's. The 
thrust of Davis' argument is that the nature of law in a 
post-apartheid society is determined by the political and 
legal struggles which take place within apartheid society. 
51 
It remains to be seen which of the options the Muslims of 
South Africa will choose. To a ·1arge extent the current 
legal and political struggles over MPL will determine its 
nature and content in the future. This will depend on·the 
strength of the political alliances between the apartheid 
state and its Muslim allies, on the one hand and the ability 
of the politicized Muslim elite and their alliances with the 
broad anti-apartheid democratic movement to mobilize against 
the state on this issue on the other hand. It also depends 
on the dynamics of anti-state·political activity and the 
extent to which Muslim activists could succeed in making MPL 
into a full-scale anti-state political issue. The 
traditional and ethnic Muslim elite are already focussing 
attention on the laws of personal status with an 
indifference towards political issues. The responses of the 
'ulama groups, AMAL and ICSA, documented earlier, reflect a 
willingness to have MPL recognized irrespective of political 
considerations. 
55. Ibid, p 83. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to point out that the legal 
discourse cannot be separated from the ideological discourse 
since law is an ideological intervention. In concert with 
political, economic and cultural factors, ideology sustains 
hegemony over the social formation. 
In the debate on MPL the Shari'a/fiqh process is also part 
of an ideological discourse. In MPL, the state is trying to 
include it into the dominant political ideology. An analysis 
of the variety of discourses point toward increasing state 
hegemony over religious minorities. Two discourses within 
the Muslim community emerge. A pro-state discourse and an 
alternative anti-state discourse. The alternative discourse 
must root itself within the historical tradition of Islamic 
law by showing that the law has consistently evaded total 
ideological manipulation by the state. Where it was 
manipulated it has been to the detriment of the law and the 
community. 56 
The next chapter will begin to explore that process through 
a comparative analysis of African Customary Law (ACL) and 
MPL. To a significant degree ACL finds itself in a similar 
situation as MPL because both are seeking to articulate new 
socio-political symbols to be applied in a rapidly 
developing and politicised social context. Some of the 
conceptual tools developed in this chapter and the previous 
56. The political resentment the imposition of a rigid 
Hanafi law on all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire has 
been cited by historians as one of the factors that 
contributed to its political decline in 1924. Also see 
Richard C.Repp, "Qanun and Shari'a in the Ottoman Context", 
in Islamic Law, (ed) Al-Azmeh, 1988, p. 124. 
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one will also be utilised in order to investigate how a 
modern state organizes a subject community. The case of ACL 
would be a convenient starting point for such an 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODERN STATE AND LEGAL PLURALISM 
Muslim Personal Law (MPL) and African Customary Law (ACL) 
Introduction 
This chapter is really a continuation of the last in that it 
explores how legal ideology actually has constructed an 
African legal subject in South Africa. The experience gained 
in African Customary Law can be useful towards understanding 
the prospects of MPL. One of the difficulties in dealing 
with a topic such as MPL is, that it has not yet been 
implemented. For this reason the discussion is to some 
extent theoretical and hypothetical. 
The South African state is a modern state since its values, 
with the exception of some, are based on those of post-
Enlightenment and European values. While large sections of 
the country and its people may as yet not have been 
modernized, the character of the state displays modern 
tendencies. Modernity is a social process with multiple 
facets which will not be examined here. It suffices to say 
that the legislative process adopted in South Africa is a 
modern one. In terms of the law it has specific features of 
which legal pluralism is a major one. 
, The modern state and legal plu~alism 
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The colonial interregnum in various parts of the pre-modern 
world, beginning in about the seventeenth century, signalled 
the non-Western world's tryst with modernity. Societies ih 
which many cultural and social systems coexist can be 
described as socially and culturally plural or pluralist 
societies. This is not a new phenomenon since history bears 
testimony to inter-civilizational exchanges, political and 
military domination, migration and a host of other forms of 
interaction leading to pluralism. Socio-political plurality 
is thus not new. In effect, the colonial expansion added to 
the cultural plurality of the oc6upied territories. 
A unique experience in non-Western societies however, was 
the process of Europeanization or modernization. Based on 
the nation-state model, unknown before the eighteenth 
century, modernization and the rise of the nation-state was 
part of the same process. Modernization is the term used to 
explain social change whereby less developed societies 
acquire characteristics common to more developed societies. 
1 The nation-state becomes the indispensable framework for 
all social, cultural and economic activities. The main 
features of this model of political organization are popular 
sovereignty, government by active consent, the growth of 
secularism, the lessening of the older religious, tribal or 
feudal loyalties, rapid urbanization, industrialization and 
communication. 2 The modern state is thus a nation-state, a 
model which has been appropriated by all ideologies, 
capitalist, socialist, communist, fascist and even religious 
ideologies. 
In the wake of colonization the processes of modernization 
came into contact with non-Western systems of law and 
obligation of an ethical, religious and unwritten nature. 
1. David Lerner, "Modernization", International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (ed) David L Sills, The 
Macmillan Company and Free Press, 1968, vol. 10, p. 394. 
2. Hans Kohn, Ibid., vol 11, p. 64. 
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Unable to replace the indigenous legal systems completely 
through the process of modernization, the nation-state 
accommodated indigenous legal systems in varying degrees. 
When in addition to socio-cultural plurality, a number of 
legal systems also exist, we can speak of legal pluralism. 
Ideally a nation-state seeks to be legally monist by 
establishing a system whereby the institutions of the state 
are the exclusive sources of law. The nation-state however, 
faces a problem in dealing with sources of law extraneous to 
itself which legal pluralism admits. The chief reason for 
this is because the nation-state is totalizing in its 
political organization. In such instances the indigenous or 
non-state law is accommodated while "the written, rational 
state system is the only one which is 'properly law,' 113 
56 
says Hooker. 
The lo$ic of modernization is to encapsulate all socio-
political organization within the framework of the nation-
state. This is called bureaucratization. It is intimately 
connected to state formation, stratification, cultural 
change and a number of other processes. For the German 
sociologist, Max Weber, bureaucratization meant, in short, 
the increasing use of formal and rationally constructed 
rules and regulations; the spread of a new ethos of legality 
and rational action; the separation of official from private 
life and the institutionalization of all this in a modern 
administration. 4 
3. Hooker, op.cit., p. 1. 
4. For a excellent study of bureaucratization see Hans-
Dieter Evers, "The Bureaucratization of Southeast Asia", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 29, 1987, 
p.667, to whom I am indebted to some novel insights on 
bureaucratization. 
Phenomenology of legal pluralism 
When ~eferring to the law of the state in legaily plural 
societies we may speak of the "d6minant" law as the law 
propounded by the nation-state and the legal system which is 
being accommodated as the "servient" law. 
Legal pluralism incorporates certain fundamental ideological 
tendencies. Some of these are, that 1) the national system 
or the dominant law is "politically sup~rior" and able to 
abolish the indigenous system[s]; 2) when there is a clash 
of obligation the rules of the national system prevails and 
allowances made for the servient law would be made on the 
premisses and forms required by the dominant system, and, 3) 
the analysis and classifications used will be that of the 
national system. 5 
Of course the discourse of. legal pluralism is geared towards 
promoting the ideological interests of the nation-state by 
utilizing the dominant legal system to achieve that end. 
Observers of legal pluralism believe it serves many 
purposes. These include: 
a) to administer indigenous peoples as a disadvantaged 
class, such as the administration of indigenous people in 
the USA, Canada (Indians), Australia (Aborigines), New 
Zealand (Maoris) and South Africa (the African people). In 
these instances the status of the indigenous people is 
ambivalent in terms of the law and·they are largely subject 
to the dominant law. 
5. Hooker, op.cit., p. 4. 
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b) to demonstrate that it is incompatible with modernization 
and replace it with one uniform civil code, after it has 
been given due "recognition", as in the case of Turkey, 
Thailand and Europ~; or to abolish it by penal statute in 
favour of a new system to realise a revolutionary ideology, 
as in the case of the Soviet Union. 
c) to have an "amalgam" of the indigenous laws and the 
dominant legal system in a uniform national law. 
In short, the nation-state strives to encapsulate the 
servient legal systems within the state. In terms of its 
bureaucratic logic, the nation-state is not reluctant to 
abolish the servient law if it is politically opportune to 
do so. In the end, legal pluralism does not seem to survive 
but is only a temporary phase towards the evolutionary 
fulfillment of the nation-state's ideal of uniform political 
organisation. 6 
Legal pluralism in South Africa 
In South Africa legal pluralism came into existence when the 
British~common law theory accorded recognition to African 
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. 6. See Yusuf Ahmed Beita, Legal Pluralism in the Northern 
States of Nigeria: Conflict of Laws in a multi-ethnic 
Environment, PhD Thesis submitted to the Dept of 
Anthropology, State Univ. of New York, published by 
University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
January 1976. Beita is of the opinion that the "development 
of plural societies can benefit more by evolving uniform or 
carefully integrated judicial systems than by maintaining 
multiple legal structures ... " p. 293. In post-colonial India 
the political and social upheaval caused by problems 
experienced in the dispensation of legal pluralism, 
especially MPL has encouraged many thinkers to advocate a 
uniform and integrated civil code. 
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polities and customs on the basis of ethnicity and race. 7 
The amalgamation of the Roman-Dutch law and the British 
common law, which later formed the South African law~ was a 
relatively coherent fusion of two legal systems which 
favoured the nation-state model. 
The discussion of legal pluralism emerges within a conflict 
perspective between indigenous and introduced legal systems. 
Raymond Suttner and others believe that ethnic forms of law 
like ACL in South Africa are designed to make the oppressed 
classes accept their subjection and accept that "there is no 
alternative" to the existing relations of production and 
domination. 8 The inefficacious application of customary law 
and the consequent frustration it causes Africans inevitably 
forces a large section of urbanized Africans to opt for the 
civil law provisions. 9 
However, the encapsulation of servient systems into the 
modern state is in reality a political accommodation which 
has a two-fold discourse to disguise its ambiguous nature. 
They are the discourse of autonomy and the preservation of 
inequality. Sally Falk Moore's anthropological paradigm of 
law as a process is helpfu1 10 . She envisions a society in 
terms of multiple layers where each layer makes its own 
7. Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper,"Introduction", in African Law: 
Adaptation and Development, University of California Press, 
1965, p. 12; Leslie Rubin, "The Adaptation of Customary 
Family Law in South Africa," in African Law, (ed) Kuper& 
Kuper, p. 197. , 
8. Raymond Suttner, "African Customary Law - Its Social and 
Ideological Function in South Africa" in Tom Lodge (ed), 
Ideology in Settler Societies, Southern African Studies, 
volume 4, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986. 
9. Raymond S. Suttner, "Legal Pluralism in South Africa," 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 19, Jan. 
1970, p.14i. 
10. s. F. Moore, Law as A Process: An Anthropological 
Approach, New York, 1978, pp. 13-30. 
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rules and adapts to rules or laws impinging upon it from a 
higher level. In this model every level has a semi-
autonomous relationship with the social field of the.nation-
state. In South Africa this semi-autonomous social field is 
visible in terms of the limited legal space given to ACL and 
the proposed MPL. However, promising as autonomy may seem, 
in reality it falls between marginal independence and 
subordination. 
M. G Smith, an outstanding contributor 'to the theory of 
plural societies, stresses the discourse which preserves 
inequality between constituent communities in plurai 
societies. Says Smith •.. 
In the plural society, whether protectorate, colony, or 
racially exclusive union, the state seeks to constitute 
a new society within a legft framework which it 
legitimates independently. (emphasis mine) 
Since the nation-state-cannot legitimate the new society 
(ACL or MPL - African or Muslim) within the mainstream of 
political organisation it will do so "within a legal 
framework" which is legitimated "independently". Bearing in 
mind that the legitimation takes place in terms of a 
superior-inferior axis, it does nevertheless create an 
institutional cleavage to reinforce the inequalities between 
those who are fully part of the nation-state and those who 
are not fully part of it. 
A key word in the legal and political jargon of legal 
pluralism is the word "recognition". In the discourse of 
legal pluralism this phrase repeatedly discloses the 
11. M.G. Smith, "The Sociological Framework of Law," in 
African Law (eds) Kuper & Kuper, p. 27. 
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ideological appropriation of language in which the 'subject' 
is subtly constructed. The law of the land is 'properly 
law', while the law of the indigenous or minority 
·. 12 
communities has to be recognized. This recognition has 
definite political connotations and signifies the power 
relations between the nation-state and the minority or 
indigenous communities who are accommodated and legitimated 
independently of .the mainstream activities of the nation-
state. 
Due to the unique political dispensation in South Africa 
which has been based on the policy of ~eparate development 
the political impact of legal pluralism towards reinforcing 
that ideology must also be considered. Separate development 
finds its roots in ethnographic studies of the nineteenth 
century and scriptural legitimation advocating the 
separateness and self-determination of people on a racial 
basis. Even in the late 1980's the ruling National Party in 
South Africa has as yet not principally shifted its 
political blueprint from this ideological position, despite 
several attempts to make it more acceptable. The ideology of 
separate development shares some of the key discursive 
-.) 
features of legal pluralism, namely, that of autonomy 
coupled with the preservation of inequality. 
Given the above it becomes evident that legal pluralism is 
an effective political strategy employed in strengthening 
the political organization of the nation-state. Through a 
process of gradual encapsulation the servient systems are 
totally absorbed by the dominant legal system. But that 
12. Suttner, 1986, p. 126; also see Hooker, op. cit., p.p. 
1-2. 
process of encapsulation is not problem- free. India is a 
good example. There issues related to MPL often cause major 
constitutional crises. This happens on those occasions when 
the Indian government attempts to reform or amend MPL 
legislation to make it compatible with the country's needs. 
Muslim protests and outcries on such instances prevent 
reforms, amendments or progressive interpretations of the 
MPL statutes since this is seen to be a religious issue over 
which the secular institutions of society have no 
jurisdiction. MPL is elevated to a position of a religious 
symbol, unchangeable and static. At the same time the 
ability of the nation-state to encapsulate a segment of 
society is also tested. 
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Communities in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies 
fail to understand the logic of the nation-state and tend to 
accept the mechanisms and_ institutions offered by the state 
at face value. Institutional cleavages such as MPL in the 
case of India are seen as tokens of religious symbolism with 
which communities identify, as in the case of India. With 
increasing modernization the content and utility of these 
symbols either undergo change or loose social relevance. Any 
changes made to these symbols, such as amendments to certain 
ordinances of MPL in India, are viewed with suspicion as 
moves to deprive people of their religious values and 
gen~rate violent social conflict. The problem evidently is 
one of amnesia that it is not the purpose or part of the 
logic of the nation-state to preserve the servient systems 
with integrity. On the contrary it tends to preserve them 
with inequality. What other purpose could- this type of 
preservation serve other than unifying the social 
organization of the nation-state and then finally phase out 
those systems that conflict with the grundnorm of the state. 
Thus far the genealogy of legal pluralism has been briefly 
traced against the backdrop of the process of modernization. 
Furthermore, after formulating an analytical grid, we are in 
a position to apply it to some concrete manifestation, 
namely ACL. The reason for doing so in this thesis with its 
focus on MPL is firstly, there are lessons to be learnt from 
ACL and its interaction with the modern nation-state. 
Secondly, the status of Muslim law or the Shari'a/figh 
process, as it is practised in the lives of the community, 
is ambivalent as far as the dominant South African law is 
concerned. 13 ACL finds itself in a similar position, within 
the peculiar and unique apartheid system. 14 Thirdly, within 
the overall conflict perspective of politics in South Africa 
the majority of Muslims are structurally disadvantaged and 
share that experience with Africans. From this analysis of 
ACL several projections could be made as to the possible 
future of MPL. 
Major Problems in ACL 
The discourses of autonomy and inherent inequality find 
themselves tailor-made to the experience of ACL. Dr 
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13. See M.S.Omar, The Islamic Law of Succession and its 
application in South Africa, Butterworths, Durban, 1988, cf. 
"Conflict between South African Law and Islamic Law", p. 5. 
A Muslim marriage solemnized by Islamic contract fails to 
fulfill the formalities laid down in the Marriage Act 25 of 
1961 in terms of which the marriage is void and the children 
thereof illegitimate. However, for taxation purposes Muslim 
marriages are recognized as valid. 
14. Hooker, op.cit., p. 5. 
H.F.Verwoerd, the architect of petty apartheid and the 
policy of separate development in 1935 rebuked the liberals 
for surreptitiously replacing the tribal customs with the 
Roman~Dutch law. Championing the cause of African autonomy, 
Verwoerd lamented the idea that ... 
there was really a deliberate attempt - especially 
through liberalistic influence- to lead the Native away 
from what was fine in his Native rights and customs ... I 
want to allow him [the African] to develop his own law 
according to changed circumsr3nces, but starting from a 
system of law which is his." 
The 1927 Bantu Administration Act which ensured uniformity 
in the recognition of customary law as a separate legal· 
system applicable to Africans only provoked Raymond Suttner 
to comment in the following words •.. 
I say that recognition [of customary law] is separate 
but unequal, because, although government spokesmen 
periodically eulogize the tribal heritage and exhort 
Africans to take pride in that which is "their own", 
customary legal institutions, particularly in regard to 
marriage are often not accorded the same degr6e of 
recognition as the Roman-Dutch counterparts. 
(emphasis mine) 
In both these statements the two discourses inherent in 
legal pluralism can be traced. From the pro-state political 
actor, Verwoerd, the ostensive autonomy of the legal subject 
is stressed. Suttner, a fierce critic of the apartheid 
state, highlights the preservation of inequality between 
constituent communities. His reference to the inequality in 
marriages on a comparative scale in ACL and Roman-Dutch law 
is a practical demonstration of the problem. 
15. South African Senate Debates, March 17, 1955, cols. 751-
752. 
16. Raymond s. Suttner, "Legal Pluralism in South Africa," 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 19, Jan. 
1970, p.140. 
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Changes in society have also affected the African way of 
life. Law in African societies is the law of the peasant, 
cattle-herding, agrarian society with a form of family 
organisation. In the Roman-Dutch law, law focuses on the 
individual and enhances modernization - urbanization and 
industrialization. 17 Law, morals and religion are viewed as 
interconnecting. Due to the economic momentum of 
urbanization; a class of Africans participating in an 
economy outside the traditional framework have emerged who 
cannot be suitably governed by tribal rules. Although tribal 
custom under chieftain rule was flexible and satisfactory it 
was effective within its context. While many urban Africans 
would like to adhere to the practice of lobolo for instance, 
where'gifts raised by the husband's group are distributed 
among the bride's family at the time of marriage, it is 
becoming increasingly difficu~t to maintain that practice. 
Marriage in an urban setting, even among Africans, is 
becoming a private affair. The innovation of cash lobolo 
fails to establish kinship and collective ties in the way 
that goods and livestock did. This is because lobolo had a 
special significance and an organic relationship to their 
rural mode of living which cannot be appreciated in an urban 
setting. A delay in lobolo payment in the lives of many 
urban Africans invariably resulted in the break-up potential 
marital relations which not infrequently lead to unmarried 
mothers being left to take care of children born outside the 
marriage. 
In the practice of ACL Africans generally find their native 
judicial dispensation to be inferior with poorly qualified 
17. Suttner, 1970, p. 138. 
commissioners administering the system. The procedures and 
cases are decided in a formalistic manner. It has been 
observed that "these courts do not perform in a manner that 
is remotely comparable to the chief's court in the dld 
society" 18 . They also lack the flexibility of the tribal 
court, a flexibility which arose from the court's position 
in the tribal society. 19 In practice the Commissioner is 
free to apply his own static version of customary law and 
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will decide on his own which is 'Black law' etc. This 
administrative weakness lead to a general disrespect for ACL 
and in turn enhances the prestige of the dominant law. 
Ethnic and religious subjects are thus indirectly encouraged 
to observe the dominant legal system due to the inability of 
the subordinate system to respond to their needs. 20 The 
discretionary powers of the commissioner's courts until 
recently were very wide giving the process a semblance of 
uniformity but where legal efficacy is actually sacrificed. 
Issues and Prospects of MPL 
Some of the incipient problems of judicial administration 
can be expected in MPL as was seen to be the case in ACL. 
South Africa has no stock of suitably qualified persons to 
serve as magistrates or qadis and lawyers in the application 
and implementation of MPL. Nor is there any institution 
where such training can be offered. Those who currently deal 
with problems affecting Muslim personal law are Middle East 
18. Suttner, 1986, p. 124. 
19. Ibid. 
20. In Malaysia, India and other countries where legal 
pluralism is to be found many Muslims have sought relief in 
the civil law since the Muslim law-courts do not meet the 
requirements of efficacy according to them. 
or Indo-Pak seminary-trained clergymen who have little 
background as to how a judiciary functions in a modern 
state. 
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In some circles there is an increasing sense of 
dissatisfaction over the way marriages, divorces, issues of 
succession etc. are being handled by the Transvaal, Natal 
Jamiats and the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC). Even if MPL 
is administered by the state or state-sponsored structures 
there is still no guarantee that the inherent problems 
related to MPL will be solved. These relate particularly to 
the content of the law which has to be adapted to the South 
African context. Some of the more important ones are the 
arbitrary male prerogative in the dissolution of marriages 
through the abuse of the talaq system, male patriarchy which 
promote gender inequality and matters related to polygamy, 
custody of children and inheritance. 
Through urbanization women are increasingly becoming 
economically independent, but have as yet not received a 
commensurate status within Islamic law. Psychologically and 
morally women still find their legal status as minors to be 
inhibiting. Urgent attention ought to be given to the 
discrimination experienced by women as a result of the male 
prerogative to divorce. By a unilateral utterance of the 
talag formula a man can instantaneously and permanently 
separate himself from his wife even if it was uttered in a 
moment of·anger or distress. To be fair, the MJC has since 
ceased to recognize this type of divorce, but the practice 
is still rife and accepted by the Transvaal and Natal 
'ulama. 
Changing social conditions have rendered many dimensions of 
the classical Shari'a/figh process inapplicable. Islamic law 
can only hope to achieve the desired results within the 
framework of religious morality if the Shari'a/figh process 
is understood as open and not close. The problems of 
inefficient judicial administration and the inflexible 
application of ACL will inevitably be repeated in MPL if far 
reaching reforms do not take place. It is also imperative 
that reforms accomodate the transitory nature of socio-
political developments South Africa is undergoing. 
A method increasingly being used in recent times to adapt 
Islamic law to new circumstances is what can be called legal 
eclecticism, known as talfig or takhayyur. This allows 
jurists and lawyers to draw from the vast reservoir of 
judicial statements made by the historical legal schools, 
especially the famous four - the Hanafi, Shafi' Maliki and 
Hanbali schools - as well as others besides them. This means 
that even though the individual may not be a follower of a 
particular legal school he/she could follow a ruling of 
another school which would satisfy his/her needs. While this 
method may be of practical use, some sections of orthodoxy 
have consistently resisted talfig. It involves preferring a 
more convenient viewpoint from one madhab in a context where 
that school of thought may not have any following at all. 
However, talfig is not problem-free since there is no 
unanimity as to its acceptance. It can also exacerbate 
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social tensions between progressive interpretations who 
prefer.unrestrained talfiq and more conservative ones who 
resist it. In my opinion, only a contemporary legal 
hermeneutic consistent with the theoretical assumptions 
f 
outlined in the previous chapters of this thesis could pave 
the way for a meaningful solution to the inherent problems 
in the content of MPL. As an interim measure the use of 
takhayyur/talfiq coupled with an acute sensitivity to socio-
politica developments can bring bring some measure of 
relief. 
For women as a socially disadvantaged group MPL could have 
several consequences. As stated before MPL as presently 
practiced in South Africa do not account for the changed 
social conditions which affect the status of women._In order 
to arrive at reforms and to re-interpret the law in order to 
suit to new conditions a general princip~e needs to be 
stated. That-is that one must accept the contention that 
specific rules of the Qur'an are conditioned by the socio-
historical background of their enactment. What is eternal 
therein is the social objectives or moral objectives which 
are to be found implicitly or explicitly in the 
legislation. 21 Understood in this way further principles 
based on the ideals of the Shari'a can be developed. To be 
effective as a realistic reformer, it was not always 
possible for the Prophet Muhammad to go beyond a certain 
limit in his legal reforms. But the changes he brought about 
21. Fazlur Rahman, "The Status of Women In Islam: A 
Modernist Interpretation," in Separate Worlds - Studies of 
Purdah in South Asia, (eds) Hanna Papanek & Gail Minault, 
South Asia Books, New Delhi, 1982, p. 310. 
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in Arabian society must be seen as fundamental moral 
guidelines along which it is expected society will evolve. 22 
In the field of general rights for spouses, the Qur'~n 
proclaims that men and women have reciprocal rights over 
each other. However, it adds that "men are but one degree 
superior to women". 23 This qualifying clause read with 4:34 
that "men are the maintainers of women ..• with what they 
spend out of their wealth" explains the superiority of men 
to they were the breadwinners and had the economic function 
to provide sustenance for their wives in sixth century 
Arabia. This ordinance has caused a divergence in the lines 
of argument. The conservatives hold that this statement of 
the Qur'an is normative. The woman, they say, can earn and 
possess wealth but is not required to spend on the household 
economy since that is the concern of the male, and therefore 
the male enjoys a certain superiority. A modern 
interpretation argues that the Qur'an is descriptive of a 
particular socio-political formation. With the inevitable 
change in society, women can and ought to become 
70 
economically independent and can contribute to the household 
economy. The superiority referred to by the Qur'an is a 
superiority of an economic position in a given society, not 
one of inherent inferiority of women. Hence the change in 
the economic status of women has a bearing upon her social 
and political status leading to equality between the sexes. 
22. This is clearly seen with regard to legislation 
affecting·s1avery. Even though.the Prophet and the Qur'an 
did not forbid slavery the moral tenor of ordinances 
affecting slaves, similar to that of laws affecting women, 
pointed towards the ideal that Islam anticipated a society 
where slavery was abolished. 
23. Al-Qur'an 2:228. 
The same applies to equal witness-worthiness of a male and 
female in court. The Qur'an states that reliable and 
unimpeachable evidence is required in civil court cases. In 
such cases, for the evidence of one male that of two females 
is regarded as equal. The Qur'an explicitly states the 
reason for this 2:1 ratio to be "for if one (female) should 
24 forget, the other might remind her". The context of this 
command relates to commercial transactions where people are 
encouraged to document commercial deals and have them 
attested in the presence of witnesses. The description of 
the Qur'an ought to be seen against its socio-historical 
background which reflects a situation where men were mainly 
operative in the commercial field and women were less 
experienced and involved in this area. Here again the 
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conservative opinion believes that the text depicts women as 
inherently inferior to men with respect to witness-
worthiness. However, taking into consideration the 
liberatory objectives of Muhammad's teachings, such 
ordinances are not normative statements, but are descriptive 
of a certain practice in a given context. Hence when the 
social conditions change, the law must change as well. 
Classical Muslim lawyers have understood this to be 
descriptive and have made changes to this practice when 
conditions warranted it. Departing form the 2:1 female to 
male ratio, they did accept the evidence of one midwife as 
sufficient evidence in a case when the maternity of a chi+d 
was in dispute. What th~se examples show is that liberatory 
measures can be supported from the ideal and classical 
24. Al-Qur'an 2:282. 
teachings of Islam. However, conseryative interpretations 
present the laws as inflexible and have the potential to 
make MPL impractical and redundant. This would in the end 
undermine the religious and spiritual concerns of the Muslim 
community. 
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Some more examples will show how classical lawyers used 
their contextual experience to interpret the law. For 
instance, if a husband deserted his wife or went missing, 
the woman could marry again. However, the waiting period 
before she could marry again is in dispute. The Hanafi law 
put this period at ninety six years, while the Maliki school 
put it at four years. Today the practice amongst even 
staunch Hanafis is to put aside the ruling of their school. 
Adopting the eclectic approach of talfiq or takhayyur they 
follow the convenience offered by the Maliki law. The 
differences arise out of two contingent observations by Abu 
Hanifa and Malik. The Hanafi ruling is based on the premise 
that the maintenance of marriage be presumed as long as 
possible and that the average life expectancy is about 
ninety six years. The wife can only marry when the husband 
is presumed dead beyond any doubt. A presumption which, 
incidentally, assumes that the marriage took place when the 
husband was an infant because the law does not even take 
into account his at the time he disappe~red in order to 
subtract his spent age from the presumed ninety six years. 
As far as redress to the surviving wife is concerned the 
Hanafi law is ridiculous. Malik based his four year waiting 
period on an observation that the maximum gestation period 
is four. years. Both judgements are premised on empirical 
observations. This means that more accurate and precise 
observations can and ought to replace these rulin~s of the 
classical lawyers. The changed social conditions have 
rendered them inapplicable. No sound jurist will allow a 
deserted wife or one whose husband had gone missing to wait 
four years today. Taking into account modern conditions, the 
MPL code in Indonesia has put the waiting period at two 
years and in Morocco it is one year. 25 
Another example is the law regarding the maintenance of a 
divorcee who is unable to support herself. The classical law 
schools allocate maintenance during the period of 'idda, a 
stipulated period of about three months, during which the 
wife cannot get married to another man. The waiting period 
or 'idda of a pregnant woman is until childbirth. 26 The 
assumption is that responsibility for the maintenance of the 
divorcee reverts back to her immediate family after the 
'idda period. It is clear that the social pattern underlying 
this legal ordinance is one of an extended family system 
based on relations of kinship in a specific economic 
formation. The reality today is that family structures have 
undergone radical changes and cannot easily and 
satisfactorily fulfill the objectives of the classical 
legislation. As in the famous Shah Banoo case in India, it 
has been proven that there are grounds for maintenance 
beyond the stipulated 'idda period for women who are unable 
or not in a position to support themselves at the time of 
25. Fazlur Rahman, "Modernization of Muslim Family Law," in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 11, 1980, 
p. 460. 
26. Depending on the condition of the divorcee the 'idda 
period would differ. 
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divorce. With the growth of new social patterns, a case 
could be made for maintenance in such cases to be a state 
responsibility or that the stipulated three month 'idda 
period be extended until the female is sufficiently 
rehabilitated to maintain herself economically. It would 
certainly be unfair to burden the ex-husband. with 
maintenance in perpetuity if there were reasonable grounds 
for divorce. However, some adequate compensation is 
obviously called for in cases of unilateral repudiation. The 
issue of alimony to a wife would certainly be a fair 
consideration in the light of the Qur'anic teachings which 
describes a marriage contract as a "solemn contract" 27 
indeed. Since marriage is a contract then in line with the 
spirit of the normative teachings of the Qur'an a unilateral 
repudiation must be considered a grave breach deserving of 
appropriate financial and social sanctions" 28 These 
adjustments of the law to modern circumstances is consistent 
with the practice of the classical jurists who were not 
loath apply apply contextual criteria in their evaluations. 
The challenge facing Muslim scholarship and the architects 
of MPL in South Africa.is to reform an~ Failing 
- . . .. . ,.,.,-------=--
to do so, MPL runs the risk of reviving the age-old 
rivalries between.legal schools. This could have serious 
consequences for the Muslim community and for the country at 
large. One example which may illustrate the potential for 
conflict will suffice. In terms of one legal school (Hanafi) 
a female may contract a marriage without the consent of her 
guardian. Another school (Shafi') would invalidate such a 
27. Al-Qur'an 4:21. 
28. Fazlur Rahman, op.cit., pp.460-462. 
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marriage. A couple following two different legal schools may 
marry in terms of the more liberal Hanafi opinion in this 
case. Such a marriage can be contested as invalid from the 
Shafi' perspective. The potential for social conflict in 
such instances is obvious if these legal differences are not 
suitably resolved through proper codification. 
It must be pointed out that while legal eclecticism (talfiq) 
could pave the way towards some short-term solutions no 
viable legal system can be proposed without a proper 
examination of the society for which it is prescribed. It is 
submitted that the best approach to MPL is to develop a 
legal system which responds to the social structure and 
reacts to what it finds as the condition in which people 
find themselves living. In addition an interpretive· 
framework ought to be developed, namely a legal theory, 
which is consistent with the historical legacy of Islamic 
law, but also suitable to the needs of modern society. 
A~ we saw in the case ACL that women in the cities suffer 
serious hardships under the traditional law. The courts and 
'th h 29 . legislature prefer to align themselves wi t e men. Even 
if the legislature had the inclination to reduce gender 
inequality it iotild be considered "politically foolhardy for 
the government to introduce reforms which could possibly 
antagonize conservative Africans, the section most likely to 
support government policy." 30 It is not at all remote a 
possibility to expect a similar logic to be applicable to 
MPL. Whereas progressive interpretations of MPL would call 
29. Suttner, op.cit., (1970) p. 152. 
30. Suttner, IBid. 
for the eradication of gender inequality, it is hard to 
conceive that the orthodox and conservative 
traditional/ethnic elite will not resist this. Gender 
inequality is a product of economic inequality which is 
linked to women's work roles under c~pitalism. 31 The state 
legislature has recently made amendments to civil law in 
South Africa in order to reduce gender inequality in some 
aspects of the civil law. Even if the state legislature has 
the best intentions to reduce gender inequality and 
discrimination in MPL it is highly unlikely that it will 
risk alienation of its traditional/ethnic elite supporters 
by bringing about far-reaching and effective reforms. In the 
event that MPL is not reformed, it will not come as a 
surprise to find Muslim men and women would seek the 
protection of the country's civil code in matters of 
personal law. If this is to happen it would defeat the 
purpose for the application of MPL to say the least, but 
would nevertheless highlight the contradictions and problems 
which are inherent in the system. 
Political Issues 
ACL was also chiefly promoted to enable the tribal 
institutions to gain legitimacy which will strengthen the 
position of the chiefs against the more radical leaders. MPL 
could have similar, if not identical, objectives. Since the 
existing management of religious and legal issues is in the 
hands of the 'ulama, a continuation of this pattern would be 
encouraged by the state as it would reinforce conservative 
31. Mervat Hatem, "Class and Patriarchy as Competing 
Paradigms for the Study of Middle Eastern Women", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 29, 1987, p. 
814. 
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hegemony. The record of the 'ulama, especially those in the 
Transvaal and Natal, during the height of South Africa's 
recent political crises has shown that they deliberately 
ignore or attempt to avoid addressing the immediate 
political issues affecting the majority of South Africans. 
At best their attitude can be described as ambiguous. Hence, 
they can serve as a buffer against the more "radical" 
leadership of the community. A similar pattern is 
discernable in the very embryonic Muslim-state relations as 
pointed out in the previous chapter with the distinction of 
the good and the bad 'subject'. The state discourse shows a 
favourable disposition towards the conservative traditional 
and ethnic elite. The similar knowledge-interests the 'ulama 
share with the pro-state actors and institutions, such as 
the Centre for Islamic Studies at RAU who have spearheaded 
the campaign to promote MPL, establishes clear links of 
reciprocal interests between the conservative Muslim 
sections and their counterparts in the broader spectrum of 
politics in South Africa. To preserve the loyalty of the 
traditional and ethnic elite, the role of MPL ought to be 
seen as a mechanism to promote a process of conservative 
hegemony in the Muslim community. In the previous chapter 
the willingness of the conservative forces to co-operate 
with the state to implement MPL has already been noted. 
While no overt political motive can be detected from their 
statements, critical analysis does however unmask the hidden 
discourses underlying the moralistic and religious tenor of 
32 the discourses which have already been documented. 
32. See the ff. 25 in chapter two, where the 'ulama 
statement prays for the speedy implementation of MPL and 
hails it as an achievement for Islam. 
From a .perspective of political ethics the attitude of the 
'ulama' and their supporters with respect to the MPL 
proposal can be described as a characteristic ambiialence 
between prudence and legitimacy. Prudence is to recognize 
the realities of politico-military powers and an anxiety to 
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maintain the integrity and peace of a society, no matter how 
nominal the good or oppressive the ruler may be. Legitimacy 
is to insist in theory on the correct qualifications of a 
ruler and the proper procedures for the management of the 
affairs of the community. While conceding that South Africa 
is not a Muslim state, the general principles of Islam are 
still obligatory on Muslims. If the Islamic principles of 
polity are conveniently set aside for purposes of expediency 
then many other practices can also be put aside, which would 
be an untenable proposition. Ibn Taymiyya has effectively 
stressed the need for legitimate political rule. 33 What is 
common to an otherwise diverse group of Muslim leaders and 
thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ranging 
from Afghani, Abduh, Hassan al-Banna, Hussain Ahmad Madni, 
Sayed Qutb; Ali Shari'ati, Mawdudi, and Khomeini34 is their 
33. Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya, Darul 
Kutub al-Arabi, (undated), p. 22. 
34. See Sarni Zubeida, "The City and its 'other' in Islamic 
political ideas and movements," 1:.-n Economy and Society, 
vol. 14, No. 3, August, 1985, pp. 319-319. Jamal ul-Din al-
Afghani was the leading reformer of the Middle East in the 
nineteenth century. Muhammad Abduh was his ztudent and 
protege, while Rashid Rida was the protege of the latter. 
Hussain Ahmad Madni was the leader of the Jamiatul ,'Ulama of 
India and close ally of the Indian National Congress. Hassan 
al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 
in Egypt and Sayed Qutb was one of the most articulate 
spokesmen of that Movement. Ali Shari'ati was one of the 
leading intellectuals of the pre-revolutionary Iran, while 
Ayatullah Khomeini was the chief figure in the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Abul A'~a Mawdudi was the founder of the Jamat 
Islami on the Indian sub-continent. 
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emphasis on legitimacy and rejection of the philosophy of 
prudence. Legitimacy of rule was the basis of the anti-
colonial struggle in Muslim countries in the Middle East and 
South East Asia. Not all leaders promoted. the doctrine of 
legitimacy. The mercenary and sycophantic certainly stressed 
' prudence to legitimacy. 
The central charge against the 'ulama and the traditional 
and ethnic supporters in South Africa is their propensity 
towards prudence and silence about the unpopular political 
practices of the apartheid state. Relations between Muslims 
and the state are not ruled out here, provided that the 
doctrine of legitimacy is satisfied. In South Africa this is 
not satisfied and hence the conflict between the 
traditional/ethnic elite and the politicized elite is bound 
to increase. 
Lessons from Algeria 
The French colonial experience in establishing gadi-courts 
in Algeria bear some impressive resemblances to developments 
in South Africa. Although it.should be borne in mind that 
· Algeria is a majority Muslim country, while Muslims in South 
Africa are barely half-a-million, the value of this 
comparison lies in uncovering the strategic logic of the 
modern state. The transformation of the Muslim court system 
took place around the 1850's to the 1870's. This was the 
immediately preceding the build-up to the Algerian war of 
liberation, November 1, 1954-July 5, 1962. Algeria was 
undergoing major political crises and internal resistance in 
a way similar to what contemporary South Africa is 
experiencing. Examining the strategies relevant to the 
bureaucratization of the Muslim courts Allan Christelow is 
of the opinion that the strategy of co-option by offering 
the Algerians a religiously-based legal system was a French 
political strategy aimed at subduing political resistance. 35 
While the French strategy had limited success two aspects of 
this struggle in the domain of legal ideology bear direct 
relevance to this study. They are the key roles played by 
the politicized and educated youth or urban elite on the one 
hand, and role of the patriarchal elite on the other. Among 
the urban elite and youth, Hamida Bin Badis, the son of the 
revolutionary, Al-Makki Bin Badis, played an active 
role.Under his leadership the youth demanded more political 
power and opposed several of the French laws of special 
taxes and laws imposed on the Muslims etc. In young Bin 
Badis' reasoning participation in the Muslim court system 
held no prospect for greater substantive autonomy for the 
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Algerians. In an impressive description of Hamida's attitude 
Christelow says ..• 
He had learned from his father that to accept the 
framework of colonial pluralism, while it may have 
offered solace to the Muslim identity, was in effect 
accept and legitimize the subordin~5e status of the Muslim within that plural system. 
The patriarchal elite and traditional notables in turn 
continued to lobby attention for Islamic legal issues by 
35. Allan Christelow, "Transformation of the Muslim Court 
System in·Colonial Algeria: Reflections on the Concept of 
Autonomy", in Islamic Law, (ed) Al-Azmeh, 1988, pp. 215-
230; see also by the same author, "The Muslim Judge and 
Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 24, 1982. 
36. Christelow, 1988, p. 227. 
t~ 
j 
approaching French officials and liberal politicians in 
France and launching petitions drives to win ears for their 
case.
37 
What they preserved was a strongly bureaucrati~ed 
Muslim cou~t system, completely.subordinated to the 
French courts and limite18in its jurisdiction to personal status affairs. 
As the demands made by the urban elite for a greater share 
of political power increased, the colonial state fell back 
increasingly on the power of the traditional elite. They 
could be relied on for support of the status quo. It was 
also the traditional elite who showed the strongest 
resistance to legal reform. One particular issue they 
blocked was reforms .affecting women's rights. Christelow 
says that with such thorough-going control one would have 
expected the enlightened French 'legal orientalists' to have 
enacted reforms in areas of women's rights. But this did not 
happen. 39 Many women who took part in the war of liberation 
40 felt that they earned the right to full equality with men. 
This is still a demand unfulfilled in modern Algeria. 
From the Algerian experience it can be expected that the 
traditional elite, which includes sections of the 'ulama, 
would have a reciprocal relationship with the apartheid 
state. The evidence for this has already been provided in 
the previous chapter. What is of considerable interest is 
/ 
the consistency of class patterns of resistance and 
37. Ibid.·· 
38. Ibid., p. 229. 
39. Ibid., p. 228. 
40. Mohammad Arkoun, "Algeria" in The Politics of Islamic 
Revivalism, (ed) ST Hunter, Indiana Univ. Press, 1988, p. 
174. 
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collaboration in Muslim society. While a section of the 
urban elite and youth showed concern for national and 
contextual issues the traditional elite lobbied frantically 
for parochial issues and reinforced patriarchy at all costs. 
For the politicized elite issues of political legitimacy 
takes precedence ·over the desire for modernization. In South 
Africa there is not much of a departure from this pattern 
either. The ideological interpellation of a 'good subject'-
the traditional elite - and a 'bad subject' -the politicized 
elite - finds an echo in the analysis of the Algerian 
experience. 
It is inevitable that MPL in South Africa will be linked to 
other ideological state apparatuses, such as the tricameral 
parliament. Since the implementation of MPL would require 
legislation to be passed by parliament it will be actively 
debated by the Muslim parliamentarians. They may also seek 
to increase their electoral votes on this issue. Or, it may 
also potentially renew hostilities between them and the 
anti-state political activists depending on a number of 
variables which makes it difficult to predict. 
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In the case of MPL it is the religious discourse which is at 
the centre of the ideological conflict. As a powerful symbol 
in society religion, as the projections for MPL in South 
Africa indicate, has the potential of both a force for 
legitimation or one for social change. 
The question of political legitimacy in Islamic political 
thought raises the question whether support and co-operation 
with an illegitimate authority would be an infringement of 
Islamic principles or not. In terms of the philosophy of 
legitimacy, participation with an illegitimate authority 
would be seen as an infringement of Islamic principles." It 
is for this reason that MPL would be resisted until such 
time that the state enjoys legitimacy. According to the 
philosophy of prudence, MPL would be in the interest of 
Muslims irrespective of the degree of illegitimacy of the 
political authority. These two strands supportive of the 
' 
philosophies of legitimacy and prudence come out quite clear 
in the examination of the discourses of the anti- and pro-
MPL lobbies respectively. 41 
CONCLUSION 
Legal pluralism is a product of modernization which is 
indispensably tied to the nation-state model. In South 
Africa this momentum of modernization exists beyond any 
doubt. What is observed is that the nation-state 
accommodates non~-state legal systems but couples it to a 
twin-discourse of autonomy and the preservation of 
inequality. These ideological dimensions are to be found in 
f 
ACL which has been operative in South Africa for many 
decades. 
We also noted how the modern state tri0s to encapsulate all 
social and political fields through a process of 
bureaucratization. It also has a logic of abolishing those 
fields that conflict with its own political interests. 
41. See chapter two. 
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As we have seen the problems faced in ACL were also to be 
found in MPL at both a theoretical and practical level. 
These include an urgent need for legal reform and the need 
to affect far-reaching reforms to restrain patriarchy. The 
brief mention of the Algerian Muslim courts and its conflict 
with the nineteenth c~ntury modern state only confirms the 
analyses already made with respect to South Africa. 
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In order to prevent MPL from becoming a servant of a ruling 
political ideology there is a need to show that Islamic law 
has an ability to respond to social conditions in a dynamic 
and practi9al manner. A legal system which is open and 
flexible has the potential to respond to socio-political 
issues from a living and contemporary context. If it is 
closed and inflexible the present will be tied to a moment 
in the past that will make Islamic law extremely 
anachronistic and soc~ally irrelevant. In such cases it 
becomes an effective ideological instrument in the hands of 
unscrupulous political authority in order to fragment 
opposition for political objectives. In that case the 
nation-state will be able to manipulate religious authority 
to serve its goals. At the same time no debate will be able 
to take place in order to challenge given positions within 
the law because the debate is not located in the present but 
in the past. Only those who claim to have religious 
authority will be able to manipulate the past into self-
serving policies. It is for this reason, that, in addition 
to the socio-political implications outlined and projected 
above, there is also an urgent need to develop a 
contemporary paradigm for the interpretation of Islamic law. 
This however, is a project beyond the scope of this limited 
thesis. 
85 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters I have identified the socio-
political implications of the implementation of MPL in South 
Africa. These implications were identified in three 
principal areas, namely, that of the Shari'a, the interface 
between law and ideology and in the area of legal pluralism 
in a modern state. 
The Shari'a 
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In .this thesis it has been pointed out that the main 
features of the Shari'a is its ability to be efficacious and 
convenient as a source of moral values from God. A 
distinction between the common understanding of the Shari'a 
and a more refined one was introduced in the debate. This 
produced an understanding of the Shari'a which admits a 
dimension of immutability as well as a dimension of 
mutability. In other words, there are levels of meaning in 
understanding the Shari'a. It was further illustrated that 
it is more accurate to speak of a Shari'a/figh process which 
reflects both the metaphysical and profahe axes of Islamic 
law. 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Shari'a/figh 
process has always been contextual in so far as it operated 
in a dialectical fashion with the socio-political process. 
Here the practice of the early Muslim jurists was cited as 
evidence in support. They saw Islamic law as an open and 
flexible system. Another dimension of this investigation 
showed that law was always the site for political struggle 
during the Islamic imperium. With this preliminary 
exposition of the relationship betwen law and .the political 
process it became manifest that law was also subject to 
ideologisation. Even the ideal metaphysical model of the 
Shari'a is the utopia and an ideological fact. 
Muslim Personal Law as a Problem in Political Discourse 
In this chapter MPL is located within the general political 
discourse of South Africa, with specific focus on the 
Muslim-state discourse. It was shown that law has the 
capacity of reproducing individuals into conforming 
political subjects in conjunction with a variety of other 
discourses. The Muslim 'subject', used in a specialised 
sense is examined in the ideological process. 
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Two ideological discourses are identified. A pro-state 
discourse supported by the traditional and ethnic elite, and 
an alternative anti-state discourse. Concerted and 
sophisticated state efforts to create a legal Muslim subject 
are identified. In turn the traditonal/ethnic elite show a 
propensity to regard the Shari'a as closed and inflexible 
and thereby creates the danger of it becoming an instrument 
of a ruling ideology. 
The Modern State and Legal Pluralism 
African Customary Law is used as an existing model· of a 
servient legal system functioning within the modern nation-
state. Some of the problems experienced in ACL were brought 
under the spotlight. It was found that the nation-state 
accomodates the servient legal systems for its own self-
interest. This surfaces when the examination discloses that 
the servient legal systems operate on the basis of autonomy 
but in such a manner that it preserves their inequality when 
compared to the dominant legal system. At some stage during 
the. evolution of the nation-state the servient laws are 
discarded in favour of the dominant legal systems. It is for 
this reason that the nation-state constantly tries to 
encapsulate the servient legal system into the 
bureaucratization process of the nation-state. 
ACL and MPL share the same problems of patriarchy, women's 
rights and the problems of dealing with modernity. One 
possible way in which servient legal systems, MPL and ACL, 
could resist encapsulation is to be open and flexible to 
change. 
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The traditonal/ethnic elite also favour a political ethic of 
prudence in order to justify their co-operation with the 
state. The politicized elite oppose them on the grounds that 
it is an infringement of Islamic ethics to support a state 
whose legitimacy is increasingly being questioned. 
Some of the key prob~ems in MPL is briefly illustrated with 
some examples. These problems call for an urgent reform of 
MPL which require a contextual hermeneutic for the 
interpretation of Islamic law which is a project which 
awaits further research. 
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ANNOUNCEMENT 
MUSLIM 
P-ERSONAL LAW 
For many years since the arrival of Islam in South Africa, Muslims have been yearning for 
the introduction of islamic Law in some form or another to govern their affairs. Various 
approaches have been made to the relevant authorities in the past but without any measure 
of success. 
On the other hand Islamic Law in some form or another has been introduced in all Muslim 
countries and Muslim Personal Law has been introduced into quite a few non-Muslim 
countries as well, e.g. India, S~ Lanka, Singapore, etc. 
It must now be known to many of us that a questionaire pertaining to issues relating to the 
possible introduction of Muslim Personal Law as part of the legal system of South Africa, 
has been received by most of the Ulamas, Imams, Muslim Lawyers and some of our 
prominent professional men all over the country. This is the very first time that Muslims 
have in any way been consulted with regard to any inclination towards giving any kind of 
recognition for Muslim Personal Law (pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc). 
We are all quite aware of the numerous problems that our brothers and sisters have had to 
face from time to time as a result of the non-recognition of our marriages. 
Ulamas from the JAMIATUL ULAMA (Natal), the JAMIATUL ULAMA (Transvaal) and 
the MUSLIM JUDICIAL COUNCIL (Cape) gathered in Durban on Sunday the 14th 
February, 1988 under the Chairmanship of Maulana Abdul Haq Omarjee of Durban to 
discuss the questionaire and formulate replies to the questionaire. The object of this 
exercise was to attend to this matter in a unified manner so that all the Ulamas of the 
country, representing and speaking for the overwhelming majority of Muslims, should on 
this issue present a UNITED FRONT BY REPLYING WITH AN UNANl1\10USLY 
AGREED VOICE. 
A joint reply has already been formulated and is being circulated to the various Ulama 
bodies. A co-ordinating committee of Ulama with members from each of the three 
provincial Ul_!!ma bodies have been set up to attend to this and other matters. Anyone 
interested and wishing to be associated with this work may contact the regional offices of 
the JAMIATUL UL1MA NATAL, Durban, JAMIATUL ULAMA TRANSVAAL, 
Johannesburg, MUSLIM JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Cape Town. 
We pray and hope for the co-operation of all Muslims in this endeavour and hope that it 
will not be long before we shall see Muslim Personal Law as part of the legal system of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
The Secretary, 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
ULAMA OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Issued by JAMIATUL ULAMA NATAL. 379 Pine Street, Durban. 
MujlisylVJg01a of South Africa 
P.O. BOX 3393, PORT ELIZABETH 6065 
ASSALAMU ALAIKUM 15th Jdmddil Uld 1408 
5th JdnUdry 1988 
A PAMPHLET BEING CIRCULATED BY SOME ·"CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 
OF JOHANNESBURG" URGES MUSLIM OliGANIZA TIONS "including the 
Jamiatul Ulamas of the Transvaal, Natal and the Cape" TO REFRAIN FROM 
ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. WHICH THE South African Law Commission 
has presented to Muslim bodies. In regard to the resolutions of this 
"Co-ordinating Comr11ittee", the MUJLISUL ULAMA OF SOUTH AFRICA 
ADVISES THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AS FOLLOWS: 
(I) The questionndire poses questions on important mdtters dffecting the 
ne-eni l1f e bf Muslims in South A fried. 
•'1'. 
(2) · The dnswers to the questions concern the Shdridh, hence unqudlif ied 
per~ons with their resoiutions dnd deliberdtions dre rejected. Wisdom demdnds 
t,,ar the questionnaire b(I fully dnsw~red with dvenues of distress dnd conflict of 
th~. law of the land wi'.tf:) th~ Shdri~h being high-lighted~ 
(3) The so-cdlled "Cp-ordindting~Committee" hds · no stdtus in the Shdriah. It 
pqssesses no Shdr'1 duthority dnd its rC'solutions dre devoid of lsldmte substdnce. 
.. . ' 
(4) This misguided ''.Co-ordindting Committee" hds displdycd deplordble ld<'k 
of understdndmg and conceit 1n urging the Jdmidtul Uldma org.iniZdt1ons to 
submit to Its (this Corrimittee's) bdat1l, baseless and un-lslamic resoluttoris. 
(5) The Jamidtul Ulc1.md organizations c1.re not subservient m dny Wd} to .l11s 
11(:omm1ttee" or to any other body. 
(6) Tl 1e Jarrnatul U'ldma WILL answer the questionnaire ,n the interests of the 
Muslim c:ommunity of Soutf, Africd, 
. . : •. I 
(7) ThC' JdmiJtuJ U.ldmd bodies dCt Ill their OWN RIGHT as representatives of 
the ShdrJdh, not dS dgcnts or rC'prE:'sentdt1ves of f 1ct1t1ous comm1 t tees 
compri'>1ng of unqudl1f1ed persons. 
(8) The Uldmd will reject dnd dismiss the su~gestion~ dnd dttempts at 
stedm-rolling and the dubious tactics initiated by juhhaal (ignordmuses) from 
dny quarter whatsoever. 
(9) The Qur'ddnic verses .cited by the "Co-ordindting Committee" m its 
pdmphlet provide neither bds1s nor sanction for the resolutions stated in the 
pdmphlet. ' . 
(I 0) Muslim organizations and indiv1dudls dre under NO hldmic oblrgdtion to 
heed the misdirected Cdll of this committee of· no Shdr'i stdndmg. 
(JI) The Ulama shc1.JI dnswer the q· :estionndire in the light of the Shdridh, The 
"shura" (consultation) r,r the juhhddl is not solicited r; r welcome. 
(J 2) Muslim organizdt1ons dre hereby urged to keep m view the best interests 
of the Muslim communit}' dnd dnswer the questionnaire m consultdtion wrth the 
Uldmd, The Qur'aan tv,ajeed commdnds: 
"0 People of lmaan! Obey Allah, obey the Rasool and the Ulul Amr among 
you." The "Ulul Amr dmong you" m this day are the Uldrnd--not some 
self-appointed · "Co-ordindtmg Committee". possessing no Shar'1 base. 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION 
ISLAMIC MARRIAGES AND RELATED MATTERS 
PROJECT 59 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(RETURN DATE: 29 FEBRUARY 1988) 
* The completed questionnaire must 
please be submitted to: 
The Secretary 
S A Law Commission 
Private Bag X668 
0001 PRETORIA 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The South African Law Commission 
The Commission is an independent statutory body established by· section 2 
of the South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973. The Commission 
consists of seven members who are appointed by the State President and 
who are representative of various branches of the legal profession. 
The chairman of the Commission is a judge of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa. Where an investigation requires specialised knowledge the Act 
makes provision for the appointment of experts either as additional members 
of the Commission or as members of a committee appointed .for purposes of a 
specific investigation. 
The objects of the Commission are to do research with reference to all 
branches of the law of the Republic in order to make recommendations for 
the development, improvement, modernisation or reform thereof. 
The South African Law Commission is presently engaged in an investigation 
into certain aspects of ls lamic marriages and their legal consequences in 
South African law. With a view to assisting the Commission in its inquiry it 
would be greatly appreciated if you would be so kind as to complete the 
attached questionnaire and return it to the Commission at the above address 
by not later than 29 February 1988. 
When an investigation has been completed, a report and a draft Bill ( if 
any) are submitted by the Commission to the Minister of Justice. 
* Origin of the investigation into Islamic marriages and 
related matters 
The investigation has a history of representations and events extending· 
over a period of about 1 O years. It was fir·st broached in representations 
addressed to the then Prime Minister and other Ministers by the Director of 
the Institute of Islamic Sharia Studies in 1975, requesting, inter alia, that 
( i) 
recognition be given to the Islamic law relating to divorce, succession and 
guardianship. These representations were then referred to the Commission. 
At the time the Commission was unwilling to include the investigation in its 
programme, firstly, because it was of the opinion that the recognition of 
the relevant aspects of Islamic law could lead to confusion in South African 
law and, secondly, because the existing rules of South African law do not 
prohibit a Muslim from living in accordance with the relevant directions of 
Islamic law. 
During the past two years aspects of Islamic law have been raised in 
certain of the Commission's investigations, namely, those into the legal 
position of illegitimate children { Project 38) and into marriages and 
customary unions of Black persons {Project 51), as well as in the review of 
the law of evidence ( Project 6) and of the law of intestate succession 
( Project 22}. The question was posed time and again whether greater 
recognition should be granted in South African law to the Islamic marriage 
and its legal consequences. 
· The Commission further took cognisance of a private Bill which Mr P T 
Poovalingam MP {House of Delegates) wanted to introduce in Parliament last 
year, the aim of which was to grant some form of recognition to the Islamic 
law of succession. The Commission, however, concluded that the problems 
connected with the non-recognition of Islamic law relating to marriage and 
succession are so interrelated that it would serve no purpose to try to 
solve them separately. It was decided to tackle the problems arising from 
the non-recognition of the Islamic marriage in a single investigation and the· 
above-mentioned Bill was then deferred pending the Commission's inquiry. 
The present investigation was included in the Commission's programme in 
July 1986. 
Purpose of this questionnaire 
The purpose of the questionnaire which follows is to ascertain to what 
extent Muslims in observing the principles and instructions of Islam come 
into conflict with rules of the South African law relating to marriage, -
divorce, succession, custody, maintenance and other aspects of the law of 
persons and the family and to seek solutions for such conflicts. 
(ii) 
• 
The above-mentioned representations and thi:~ research done thus far have 
already identified in theory certain aspects as possible problem areas, 
namely, the non-recognition of the Islamic marriage, divorce and intestate 
succession. However,· confirmation of the fact that in practice problems do 
exist in these areas and information as to how it affects the Muslims in 
South Africa can only be obtained from the Muslims themselves. In order 
to afford you an opportunity to bring your problems in this regard to the 
Commission's attention, the questionnaire below covers all three of the 
, above-mentioned aspects as well as related matters. It is being circulated 
amongst those Musi im religious leaders, Muslim organisations, South African 
lawyers who are Muslims and other persons who, in the Commission's 
opinion, can make a useful contribution . 
To be of value to the Commission it is necessary lhat your answers, where 
applicable, should be detailed and that the grounds on which your answers 
are based should be furnished. You are welcome to submit memoranda to 
the Commission on any of the aspects touched upon or on other aspects 
which you consider to be important. 
Where the questionnaire is addressed to the president or chairman of a 
body, it is the intention that the answers should reflect the view of the 
body concerned and not only the personal views of the president or 
chairman. 
The Commission is well aware that the knowledge which it can acquire from 
a study of I iterature on Islamic Jaw and the interpretation thereof is not 
sufficient to enable it to form considered opinions on the problems 
concerned. Therefore the Commission would not like to create the 
impression that it pretends to be knowledgable in Islamic law. It would 
rather confirm its dependence on experts from the ranks of Muslims in this 
respect. 
Thank you very" much for your co-operation. 
( iii) 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
* · Islamic authority structures in South Africa 
l. Is there any formal hierarchy amongst Muslims in South Africa? 
2. Is there any institutive body amongst Muslims which can speak 
authoritatively for all Muslims in South Africa and whose pronouncements on 
Muslim matters and rules of the Islamic law are binding on all Muslims in 
South Africa? 
3. What authority does a decision of a body like the Jamiatul Ulama 
Transvaal or its counterpart in Natal or the Muslim Judicial Council of the 
Cape or the Islamic Council have? 
4. Do the said bodies have any formal contact with each other and 
do they take cognisance of each others pronouncements on Islamic-juridical 
matters relating to Islamic law? 
5. (a) Which body or bodies are competent to apply and enforce 
Islamic law in South Africa? 
(b) How is such a body or bodies constituted? 
6. Which procedures does such a body follow? 
7. (a) What sanctions ( if any) are available to ensure the 
enforcement of Islamic law, if necessary? 
(b) Is there any appeal against the decision of a person or body 
who applied or enforced Islamic law in the first instance? If 
so, to whom? 
1 
8. To what extent is a decision or the advice of an Ulama binding 
and is it observed by the Muslim community? 
* Contemporary observance and application of Islamic law 
in South Africa 
9. Are the prescriptions of the Sharia regarding marriage. divorce 
and succession in general observed strictly by Musi ims in South Africa? 
10. Where Islamic law in respect of any of the above-mentioned 
matters is in conflict with the law of the land. does the average Muslim 
observe Islamic law or the law of the land? 
11. Is Islamic law as it is applied in South Africa today. in 
accordance with the traditional · Islamic law, or has it been 
adapted or modernised in some respects in accordance with the Western way 
of life? 
12. {a) How will a member of th·e Muslim community set about 
resolving a legal problem which he has in connection with 
the law of marriage or succession? 
(b) Wi II an Islamic authoritive body also advise. such a person, 
-.yhere applicable, on the law of the land? 
13. To what extent can changed circumstances and needs lead to the 
adaptation of Islamic l.:1w? 
14. What role does the interpretation of Islamic law play in the 
application thereof and how are conflicting interpretations reconciled? 
2 
* Conclusion of marriage 
1 5. Can you give an estimate of the percentage of marriages entered 
into by Muslims in South Africa -
(a) in accordance with Islamic law only? 
(b) in accordance with lslamic~law as well as South African law? 
16. Do marriages entered into in accordance with South African law 
only, ever occur amongst Muslim·s (that is a marriage not entered into in 
accordance with Islamic law)? 
17. For what reasons do Musi ims find it necessary to enter into a 
marriage in accordance with Islamic as wel I as South African law? 
18. Is there any Muslim body in South Africa which at present 
controls marriages in accordance ·with Islamic law or which advises persons 
regarding the conclusion of such marriages.? 
19. How is a val id Islamic marriage concluded in South Africa? 
20. Are Islamic marriages ever solemnised by Muslims appointed as 
marriage officers in terms of section 3 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961? If 
not, why not? 
21. (a) Are Islamic marriages at present registered in any way? 
( b) If so, is registration compulsory? 
3 
(c) If not, is there any way in which the existence of an Islamic 
marriage can be formally ascertained? 
(d) Is it desirable that there should be some form of registration 
if it does not exist at present? 
22. Would you ( if you are a Muslim) advise a member of your family 
to enter into a civil marriage? Give reasons. 
23. It appears as though Muslims are unwilling to enter into civil 
marriages. Is this true and if so, why? 
24. Do Muslims who enter into a marriage in accordance with Islamic 
law encounter any practical problems if they do not also have their marriage 
solemnised in accordance with South Africa·n law? If so, what problems? 
25. Is the average Muslim aware of the fact that his Islamic marriage 
is not recognised - in South African law? If so, how does he experience this 
situation? 
26. Is there a need for the recognition of the Islamic marriage as a 
marriage in the South African law? If so, why? 
* Poligamy 
27. To what extent do poligarnous marriages still occur amongst 
Muslims in South Africa? 
4 
28. Would it be acceptable to Muslims if only monogamous marriages 
are recognised? 
* Matrimonial property 
29. In the case where a Muslim enters into a marriage in accordance 
with Islamic as well as South African law, which matrimonial property 
system is usually chosen by the parties -
+ a marriage in community of property? or 
+ division of property by antenuptial contract? or 
+ a marriage according to the accrual system? 
30. What in your opinion are the reasons for the respective choices as 
mentioned in the previous question? 
31 . Is the average Muslim aware of the different choices between 
matrimonial property systems which exist in terms of South African law?· 
32 Would a marriage -
+ in community of property; or 
+ according to the accrual system; 
be in conflict with the principles .of Islamic law? 
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* Status of children 
33. Are Muslims aware of the fact that if they do not enter into a 
civil marriage their children are regarded by the South African law as 
illegitimate?· What is their attitude in this connection? 
34. What practical problems are caused by the present legal position 
regarding the status of children born from an Islamic marriage? 
* Divorce 
35. Is there any Muslim ·body who presently controls divorce in 
accordance with Islamic law in South Africa? 
36. (a) Is there any need that divorces in · terms of Islamic law 
should be registered? 
(b) If not, how is the divorce made known? 
* Maintenance 
37. Is a woman whose marriage was dissolved in accordance with 
Islamic law entitled to the payment of maintenance by her ex-husband, 
either by way of periodical payments or otherwise? 
38. Does Islamic law recognise a right to maintenance-
(a) in respect of a child by both parents; 
6 
(b) against a child for both his parents? 
39. Are any problems experienced in the application of the South 
African law regarding maintenace in favour of-
(a) spouses; 
(b) dependent children; and 
( c J other dependents? 
* Guardianship 
40. (a) Are any problems experienced in the application of South 
African Law in respect of g~ardianship over Muslim minors? 
{b) If so, what problems? 
* Succession 
41. Is it common for Muslims to make wills according to the provisions 
of the South African law of succession? If not, why not? 
42. In cases where Muslims dispose of their property by will, is it 
common or exceptional that they provide in such a will that their estate 
should devolve according to Islamic law? 
43. Does it occur in practice that a Muslim only disposes by will of 
that part of his estate which he is entitled to dispose of according to 
Islamic law? 
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44. Does it occur that Muslims provide in their wills for the 
devolution of their estate in a way which is in· c::>nflict with the rules of 
Islamic law? If so, what is the reason for .this? 
45. Whom does a Muslim in South Africa approach for advice with 
regard to the drawing up of a will? 
46. (a} How does a Muslim dispose of his estate in terms of Islamic 
law? Does it take place formally or informally: orally or in 
writing? 
(b} Does it also apply to that part of his estate in respect of 
which a Muslim has the right to dispose? 
47. Are Muslims in general aware of the fact that they can provide by 
will that thei_r estates must devolve according to Islamic law? 
48. Does it generally occur that a re-distribution agreement is 
concluded by Muslim heirs to give effect to the Islamic law of succession in 
stead of succession according to South African law? 
49. Are there any practical problems attached to such a 
re-distribution agreement? 
· SO. Does it happen that heirs refuse to agree to a re-distribution of 
the estate in terms of Islamic law? 
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* fnfluence of the South African matrfmonfaf property raw 
51. Does the div is ion of a joint estate where Muslims were married in 
community of property create practical problems? ff so, which problems? 
* Minority 
52. In view of the fact that the· lsfamic raw does not recognise a 
specific age of majority, does the age of majority in South African law and 
the legal incapacities resulting therefrom cause Muslims any problems? ff 
· so, what problems? 
53. Do Muslims encounter any problems in connection with South 
African legal provisions regarding curatorship and minority? 
54. What objection. if any. do Muslims have against the provisions of 
the South African raw regarding the safe keeping of a minor's inheritance in 
the Guardian's Fund? 
* General 
55. Which other practical problems are experienced as a result of ttJe 
non-recogn_ition of the Islamic law of succession? 
56. (a) Who should. in your view. exercise control over the 
administration of Muslim estates? 
(b) How would the controlling body or executor know that the 
estate should be distributed in terms of Islamic law? 
9 
* Other information 
57. Would you like to suggest any practical solutions for the problems 
which might appear from the questions above? 
58. · Is Islamic law in itself capable of adapting to modern needs and to 
the demands of the South African legal system within which it will have to 
operate? 
59. Do you experience any other problems regarding family and 
personal law and the law relating to marriage as a result of the fact that 
Islamic law is not recognised in South Africa? 
60. Which court or body should, in your view, determine questions 
relating to Islamic law? 
61. How should such a court or body operate if the Islamic law is not 
certain or if there is a dispute between different controlling bodies? 
* Particulars of respondent 
(a) The respondent is-
A Muslim 
A Hindu 
Other denomination 
10 
(b) The respondent is residing in-
The Cape Province 
Transvaal 
Natal 
Orange Free State 
(c) The particulars are given-
in my personal capacity 
on behalf of an organisation 
which represents Muslims 
on behalf of an organisation 
which DOES NOT represent 
Muslims 
(d) The following information would greatly assist the Commission. in 
further consultation, if necessary, but you are not obliged to 
furnish it: 
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. ( i) If you completed the questionnaire in your personal capacity 
please furnish your name and address: 
OR 
(ii) If this questionnaire reflects the views of an association or 
body please furnish the name and address of that association 
or body: 
12 
i ·, AUS 198S . 
